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Cyberspace1 changes  the  reality  of  today’s  world.  It  provides  us  with  immense 
opportunities and benefits, but it also bears risks and security challenges. Activities 
carried out via cyber means proved efficient for malicious purposes. Many of these 
activities may have significant impacts on their targets, which include both private 
entities and States. Moreover, the character of cyberspace enables malicious actors 
to conduct operations remotely and to obscure their identity. This raises questions 
on how to protect the rights and interests of the victims of hostile cyber operations 
and how the responsibility for the operations can be constituted if the source of the  
operation is unattainable.
On 24 November 2014, an American company, Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., 
found itself under a cyber attack after it rejected a request of a hacker group calling  
itself “Guadians of Peace” to cancel the release of a satirical movie “The Interview” 
depicting an assassination of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un.2 Consequently, 
the hacker group released personal information of Sony’s employees, such as social 
security  numbers  or  medical  records,  and  sensitive  personal  correspondence.3 
Moreover, the attack destroyed Sony’s computer systems, which made the company 
to  take  its  entire  network  offline.4 The  attack  further  temporarily  disrupted  the 
1 The glossary of Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the international law applicable to cyber operations defines 
cyberspace as follows: “The environment formed by physical and non-physical components to store, modify, 
and exchange data using computer networks.” In SCHMITT, Michael N et al. Tallinn manual 2.0 on the 
international law applicable to cyber operations. Second edition. New York, the United States of 
America: Cambridge University Press, 2017. ISBN 978-1-316-63037-2. Glossary. p. 564. (hereinafter 
Tallinn Manual 2.0). 
2 RUSHE, Dominic, LAUGHLAND, Oliver. Sony cyber attack linked to North Korean government 
hackers, FBI says. The Guardian [online], 19 December 2014. Available from 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/19/north-korea-responsible-sony-hack-us-official. 
3 BOORSTIN, Julia. The Sony hack: One year later. CNBC [online], 24 November 2015. Available from 
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/24/the-sony-hack-one-year-later.html. 
4 Update on Sony Investigation. FBI.gov [online], 14 December 2014. Available from 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-sony-investigation.
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company’s business activity and allegedly cost Sony tens of millions of dollars. 5 The 
subsequent FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) investigations did not reveal the 
identity  of  the  responsible  hackers.  FBI  only  managed  to  unveil  circumstantial 
evidence related to the attack.6 Therefore, the legality of the attribution of the attack 
to North Korea is questionable.7 Nevertheless, the investigations disclosed that the 
North Korean cyber infrastructure8 was used in the operation.9 If North Korea was 
not responsible for the cyber attack, as it claimed,10 but it knew about the use of its 
infrastructure in the attack, should it have taken any steps to prevent the attack? 
And if it did not take any such steps, could it be held responsible for its negligence?  
More broadly, does the North Korean sovereignty over its cyber infrastructure imply 
any  obligations  towards  other  States?  In  the  following  paragraph,  I  shortly 
demonstrate how the application of the due diligence principle works on a real-
world  example.  Similar  analysis  with  the  same  conclusion  was  also  made  by 
Professor Schmitt11 and other scholars.12
The due diligence principle entails an obligation of every State to ensure that its 
territory is not used for acts contrary to other States’ rights. Assuming for the sake of  
this analysis that North Korea knew about the use of its territory in the attack, it  
5 BOORSTIN, Julia. The Sony hack: One year later. CNBC [online], 24 November 2015. Available from 
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/24/the-sony-hack-one-year-later.html. 
6 Update on Sony Investigation. FBI.gov [online], 14 December 2014. Available from 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-sony-investigation.
7 ZETTER, Kim. Critics Say New Evidence Linking North Korea to the Sony Hack Is Still Flimsy. Wired 
[online], 1 August 2015. Available from https://www.wired.com/2015/01/critics-say-new-north-korea-
evidence-sony-still-flimsy/.
8 Cyber infrastructure is an infrastructure composed by “the communications, storage, and computing 
devices upon which information systems are built and operate.” See Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. 
Glossary. p. 564. 
9 Update on Sony Investigation. FBI.gov [online], 14 December 2014. Available from 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-sony-investigation. 
10 North Korea: Sony hack a righteous deed but we didn't do it. The Guardian [online], 7 December 
2014. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/07/north-korea-sony-hack-a-
righteous-deed-but-we-didnt-do-it. 
11 SCHMITT, Michael N. International Law and Cyber Attacks: Sony v. North Korea. Just Security 
[online], 17 December 2014. Available from https://www.justsecurity.org/18460/international-
humanitarian-law-cyber-attacks-sony-v-north-korea/. 
12 See, e.g. WALTON, Beatrice A. Duties Owed: Low-Intensity Cyber Attacks and Liability for 
Transboundary Torts in International Law. Yale Law Journal, 2017, vol. 126, no. 5, pp. 1462–1465.
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should have taken measures to put an end to the attack violating the United States 
sovereignty. If it possessed measures to terminate the attack and failed to employ 
them, it would breach its due diligence obligation. The breach of the due diligence 
obligation would give rise to North Korean State responsibility under international 
law.  Consequently,  the  United  States  could  lawfully  resort  to  countermeasures 
against  North  Korea.  Eventually,  the  United  States  announced  that  it  would 
undertake  retaliatory  action.  Shortly  after  the  announcement,  the  Internet 
infrastructure in North Korea experienced two temporal  blackouts lasting hours. 
The United States did not officially acknowledge nor deny that it was behind the 
outages leaving them in a gray zone. If the blackouts were the retaliatory action 
promised by the United States, they would be clearly disproportionate – even if the 
North Korean government itself was the perpetrator of the attack on Sony.
The application of the due diligence principle could provide a legal framework to 
situations similar to that of the US-North Korean dispute eliminating the avoidance 
of responsibility and gray-zone operations. Furthermore, its application could bring 
more  mutual  respect  to  States’  rights  in  cyberspace  and,  consequently,  more 
stability in international relations. While some efforts related to the refinement of 
the due diligence principle in the cyber context have already been made, much still 
must be done. This thesis is a contribution to the on-going debate on the adequate 
application of the due diligence principle and its limits in cyberspace. It  aims to 
comprehensively  analyze the due diligence principle  and its  role  and use in the 
cyber context.
The  main  goal  of  this  thesis  is  to  examine the  adaptability  of  the  due diligence 
principle to cyberspace and the adequacy of its application therein. In particular, I  
ascertain  whether  and how  the  international  community  could  benefit  from the 
application  and  whether  the  application  gained  any  support  from  the  States. 
Further, I study whether and how the due diligence principle could be applied in the 
cyber context. Since cyberspace is a very specific environment, I examine what are 
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the  limits  of  the  application  of  the  due  diligence  priniciple  with  respect  to  this 
specific character.
Although the international law principle of due diligence is mostly known from the 
famous  case  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  (hereinafter  ICJ)  case  Corfu 
Channel,  its  use  in  international  law  has  historical  origins  reaching  to  the  19 th 
century.  Nowadays,  its  application is  reaching to  many special  international  law 
regimes. Therefore, I briefly introduce the principle of due diligence as a general 
principle of international law and its historical background in chapter 1 referring to 
historical cases, subsequent efforts of codification of due diligence in the context of 
the law of State responsibility, and its use in special international regimes. After this 
introductory chapter, I will outline the main specific benefits of the application of 
the due diligence principle in cyberspace in chapter 2.
Chapter  3  reflects  the  current  state  of  the  international  mechanisms established 
within the United Nations, where representatives of States discuss the application of 
the  international  law  in  cyberspace  with  a  special  focus  on  the  role  of  the  due 
diligence principle. In the last section of chapter 3, I introduce and analyze detailed 
views  on  the  application  of  the  due  diligence  principle  of  three  States  that 
expressively addressed the principle in their position papers on the application of 
international law in cyberspace.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the analysis of how the due diligence principle should be 
applied in cyberspace. The analysis identifies the basic elements triggering the due 
diligence obligation and their  potential  adjustments.  Further,  some controversial 
aspects of the application of the due diligence principle are commented on. Lastly, I 
study legal and practical problems related to the constitution of the breach of the 
due diligence obligation.
The primary source I use for the analysis in chapter 4 will be Tallinn Manual 2.0, an  
excellent study on the application of international law to cyber operations. Tallinn 
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Manual  2.0  is  the  most  authoritative  text  on  the  issue  produced  by  academic 
researchers in cooperation with national legal experts.  Where appropriate, I  also 
reflect official State positions on particular issues. It is noteworthy that even though 
Tallinn  Manual  2.0  was  published  quite  recently  (in  2017),  the  mentioned  State 
positions  were  articulated  after  the  publishment  of  the  Manual.  At  the  time  of 
writing,  there  is  no  other  comprehensive  study  on  the  due  diligence  principle, 
which  would  include  both  the  above-mentioned  official  positions  of  States  and 
Tallinn Manual 2.0.
Because the breach of  the due diligence obligation,  i.e.  international  obligation, 
gives rise to State responsibility under international law, the injured States have the 
right  to resort  to self-help remedies under the law of State  responsibility,  which 
include acts of retorsion and countermeasures. In chapter 5, I overview the legal 
requirements  of  these  self-help  instruments  in  the  light  of  the  specific 
characteristics of cyberspace.
Ultimately,  in  chapter  6,  I  study  the  preventive  feature  of  due  diligence.  In 
international  environmental  law,  the  due  diligence  principle  has  a  relevant 
preventive  feature  lying  in  the principle  of  prevention.  Therefore,  I  analyze  the 
transferability of this principle into the cyber context. Moreover, I emphasize the 
influential role posed by certain private entities in relation to the prevention of harm 
to States and its possible implications.
All of the online sources were accessed between November 2019 and March 2020.
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1 The Principle of Due Diligence as a general principle of 
International Law
The  due  diligence  principle  is  a  well-established  and  recognized  principle  of 
international  law  deriving  from  the  fundamental  international  law  principle  of 
sovereignty. It was best articulated in the  ICJ judgment Corfu Channel, where the ICJ 
held that it is “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for 
acts contrary to the rights of other States.”13 The relation of the due diligence principle 
to the principle of sovereignty is clear. While States enjoy sovereignty over their 
territory, they are obligated to protect other States' rights within this territory. As 
noted in Island of Palmas case “territorial sovereignty […] involves the exclusive right to 
display the activities of a State. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect  
within the territory the rights of other States,  in particular their right to integrity and 
inviolability in peace and in war, together with the rights which each State may claim for  
its nationals in foreign territory.”14 However, this obligation to protect is not absolute. 
Rather than effectively protect other States’ rights, States must use their best efforts 
to do so.
Due diligence is a standard of conduct. The materialization of a result – harm to a 
State’s rights – does not imply non-compliance with the due diligence standard. It is 
the failure to take available measures to protect other State’s rights that imply non-
compliance with the standard. The availability of measures always depends on the 
situation  in  concern  and  the  capacity  of  the  obliged  State.  Due  diligence  is, 
therefore, adaptable to various contexts and its application is flexible. When a State 
finds itself in a situation when it has a variety of available measures at disposal, it 
13 Corfu Channel case, Judgment of 9 April 1949. I.C.J. Reports 1949. p. 22.
14 Island of Palmas case (United States of America v. Netherlands), 4 April 1928, Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards, VOLUME II. p. 839.
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can choose which of them it will use.15 In contrast, it may result that even though a 
territory of a State was used to cause harm to another State and the territorial State 
did  not  take  any  measures  to  prevent  the  harm,  the  territorial  State  might  still  
behave in compliance with due diligence standard because no measures available to 
it could have prevented the harm.
The  fundamental  element  of  the  due  diligence  principle  is  reasonableness.16 
Obligations derived from the due diligence principle should not require States to do 
more than it should be reasonably expectable from them in given circumstances.17 
Therefore, the reasonableness is the most fundamental factor for the refinement 
and the application of the due diligence principle, for the development of special 
due diligence  obligations  in  special  international  law  regimes  as  well  as  for  the 
determination of breaches of the due diligence obligations.
1.1 Historical origins of the Application of the Due Diligence 
Principle 
In the context of international law, the due diligence principle was applied for the 
first time in the late 19th century. The application occurred in an arbitration case 
known as Alabama Claims between the United States of America and Great Britain.18 
In the international arbitration established by the bilateral Treaty of Washington, of 
the 8th of May 1871, the Brits were found to be in violation of their due diligence 
obligation  by  allowing  the  construction,  equipment,  and  armament  of  vessels, 
including  a  cruiser  Alabama,  in  their  ports.  Subsequently,  these  vessels  were 
15 FRENCH, Duncan (Chair) and Tim STEPHENS (Rapporteur). ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in 
International Law, Second Report. 2016. p. 9. 
16 Ibid.
17 Yet, sometimes States go beyond of what is reasonably expectable and provide higher standards of 
protection of other States’ rights. Adhering to such standards is not obligatory under international 
law, but it significantly contributes to the enhancement of international cybersecurity and mutual 
trust among States.
18 Alabama claims of the United States of America v. Great Britain, Arbitration Award rendered on 14 
September 1872 by the tribunal of arbitration established by Article I of the Treaty of Washington of 8 
May 1871, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Volume XXIX, pp.125-134
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deployed as warships of the Navy of the Confederate States in American civil war.  
The United States diplomatic agents knew that the vessels were being constructed in 
British ports, which should have been neutral, and required the British authorities 
to  put  an  end  to  the  construction  works.  Great  Britain,  at  last,  did  take  some 
measures  by  ordering  the  detention  of  the  vessel  Alabama  but  the  orders  were 
issued  with  an  extensive  delay,  which  made  their  execution  impossible.  To  the 
alleged failure to comply with the due diligence principle, Great Britain stated that 
“[i]t  is  necessary  to  allege  and  to  prove  that  there  has  been  a  failure  to  use  for  the 
prevention of an act which the government was bound to endeavor to prevent, such care as 
governments  ordinarily  employ  in  their  domestic  concerns,  and  may  reasonably  be 
expected  to  exert  in  matters  of  international  interest  and  obligation.”19 If  such  a 
restrictive interpretation were accepted,  due diligence standards would be easily 
limitable by domestic standards and laws.
The arbitrators, however, did not regard this interpretation relevant. Instead, they 
ruled that “the government of Her Britannic Majesty cannot justify itself for a failure in 
due diligence on the plea of insufficiency of the legal means of action which it possessed. ”20 
Hence, Great Britain, as a neutral State, should have acted proportionally to the risks 
that  the  construction  of  warships  posed.  So  even  though  the  arbitrators 
acknowledged that Great Britain had taken some measures, they qualified them as 
inadequate to the situation. And being considered insufficient, the measures taken 
could not release Great Britain from the responsibility. If a similar case got before a  
judicial organ nowadays, the decision would probably read that Great Britain ‘did 
not take all the feasible measures’ available to it at the time. The adequacy of the 
action that a State should take in order to fulfill its due diligence obligation remains 
19 United  States  Department  of  State,  Office  of  the  Historian.  Case  presented  on  the  part  of  the 
government of Her Britannic Majesty to the tribunal of arbitration, constituted under Article 1 of the treaty 
concluded at Washington on the 8th May, 1871, between Her Britannic Majesty and the United States of  
America, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress with 
the Annual Message of the President, December 2, 1872, Part II, Volume I. Document 16, part X.
20 Alabama claims, supra note 18. p. 131. 
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a cornerstone of the due diligence principle so as the non-relevance of domestic law 
obstacles does. The adequacy required differs on the basis of many factors case-by-
case. Therefore, due diligence should always be considered flexibly as it depends on 
present circumstances.
Since  Alabama  Claims,  where  the  principle  of  due  diligence  was  applied  in  the 
context  of  the law of  neutrality, the principle  has found its  use in a  number of 
special  regimes  in  public  international  law.  In  late  19th Century  and  early  20th 
Century, the due diligence principle was mostly applied in arbitration cases related 
to the protection of aliens in the territory of foreign States. Residing in the territory 
of foreign States,  aliens should have been under the territorial  States’  protection 
against criminal acts directed at them or their property. Such criminal acts usually 
occurred in situations of domestic unrests, occasional violent acts, but also in case 
of  armed  conflicts.  The  obligation  of  protection  also  included  the  duty  to  duly 
investigate all those criminal acts.
In  Sambiaggio case,21 decided by Italian-Venezuelan mixed commission, an Italian 
national  residing  in  Venezuela  was  forced  to  make advances  and hand over  his 
property to revolutionary forces. This case was notable in light of the situation in 
which the events took place as Venezuela suffered a civil war at that time. For this 
reason, “[t]he immediate and most important question presented is as to the liability of the 
[then] existing government for losses and damages suffered at the hands of revolutionists  
who failed of success.”22 To answer this question,  the umpire concluded, from the 
standpoint of general principle, that the Government should not be held responsible 
for  the  acts  of  revolutionists,  because  revolutionists  are  not  the  agents  of 
government. They were beyond governmental control, and no one should be held 
responsible for the acts of an enemy attempting his life.23 Nevertheless, the umpire 
“accept[ed] the rule that if in any case of reclamation submitted to him it is [sic] alleged  
21 Sambiaggio Case, 1903, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Volume X, pp. 499-525.
22 Ibid., p. 512
23 Ibid., p. 513
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and proved that Venezuelan authorities failed to exercise due diligence to prevent damages 
from being inflicted by revolutionists, that country should be held responsible.”24 And as 
subsequently noted by the umpire, the mentioned responsibility would be for the 
acts of the revolutionary forces.25 Although the view that a State could possibly be 
indirectly responsible for the acts of its nationals was not rare in the earliest cases,26 
it has been overcome quite soon. One of the first cases where such an approach was 
rejected was the case Janes v. Mexico.27 
Janes was a United States citizen, superintendent of mines for the El Tigre Mining 
Company at El Tigre in Mexico. In 1918 he was shot and killed by a Mexican national 
Pedro Carbajal, a former employee of the mining company. The shooting occurred 
in the view of many persons in the company’s office. Carbajal escaped the place, and 
even though Mexican authorities were informed about had occurred, they failed to 
apprehend and punish Carbajal. Consequently, United States alleged Mexico that its 
authorities “took no proper steps to apprehend and punish Carbajal; that such efforts as 
were made were lax and inadequate; that if prompt and immediate action had been taken 
on one occasion there is reason to believe that the authorities would have been successful.”28
According to United States’ opinion presented in Janes v. Mexico, “responsibility rests 
upon the offending State because by its failure to act it condones and ratifies the wrongful 
act, thereby making the act its own.”29 The arbitrators entitled this concept “indirect 
responsibility.”  To  acknowledge  the  application  of  the  “indirect  responsibility” 
would mean that the compensation of the damage caused would be measured in a 
different manner, which would make it higher. The arbitrators, however, rejected 
24 Ibid., p. 524.
25 Ibid.
26 DE BRABANDERE,  Eric.  Host  States'  Due  Diligence  Obligations  in  International  Investment  Law. 
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce vol. 42, 2015. pp. 319–361. p. 327.
See also H. G. Venable (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 8 July 1927, Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards, Volume IV, pp. 219-261, para. 23.
27 Laura  M.  B.  Janes  et  al.  (U.S.A.)  v.  United  Mexican  States,  16  November  1925,  Reports  of 
International Arbitral Awards, Volume IV, pp. 82-98.
28 Ibid., p. 83
29 Ibid., p. 90.
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the application of  the concept  of  “indirect  responsibility”  and instead ruled that 
governments  can  be  held  responsible  only  for  what  they  commit  or  omit 
themselves, not for actions or omissions of their nationals.30 That did not mean that 
Mexico avoided responsibility.  It  was held responsible. But its responsibility was 
constituted  on  the  basis  of  the  breach of  a  due  diligence  obligation,  i.e.  by  the 
inaction (omission) of its organs to apprehend and punish Carbajal, not by the act of 
murder.  In  other  words,  the  murder  committed  by  a  Mexican  national  was  not 
attributable to Mexico. The lack of due diligence of Mexican authorities was.
1.2 Codification efforts in the context of the law of State 
responsibility
After the essential content of the due diligence principle had taken some shapes, 
particularly in the light of the arbitration cases concerning the protection of aliens, 31 
the topic of due diligence got onto the agenda of the 1930 Hague Conference for the 
Codification of International Law32 (hereinafter the Hague Codification Conference) 
under the issue of “responsibility of states for damage done in their territory to the 
person or property of foreigners.”33 The protection of aliens was one of the main 
concerns  of  the  forty-seven  States  participating  in  the  Hague  Codification 
Conference.  Unfortunately,  the  conference  “failed  to  adopt  even  a  single 
recommendation on the subject of State responsibility.”34 The failure demonstrated that 
30 Ibid.,  p.  88.  It  has  to  be  added  that,  at  the  time,  the  arbitrator  didn’t  refuse  the  indirect 
responsibiliy absolutely. They retained one exception to the general rule: “Only in the event of one type 
of denial of justice, the present one, a State would be liable not for what it committed or omitted itself, but for  
what an individual did. Such an exception to the general rule is not admissible but for convincing reasons.” 
31 See also  The Case of  the S.S.  "Lotus" (France v.  Turkey),  7 September 1927,  Permanent Court  of 
International Justice, Series A. - No. 10., or Thomas H. Youmans (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 23 
November 1926, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Volume IV, pp. 110-117. 
32 KOIVUROVA, Timo. Due Diligence. Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. 2010. DOI 
10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/e1034.
33 Preparatory Committee for the Codification Conference. First Report submitted to the Council by 
the  Preparatory  Committee  for  the  Codification  Conference,  Conference  for  the  Codification  of 
International Law, Hague, 1930.
34 Codification Division of the Office of Legal Affairs of United Nations. League of Nations Codification 
Conference.
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despite States’ awareness of the importance of the issue, coming to an agreement on 
the  rules  will  not  be  without  complications.  For  the  next  few  decades  after  the 
failure  of  the  Hague  Codification  Conference,  the  content  of  the  due  diligence 
principle was mostly formed by the State practice and case-law.
As concerns codification efforts related to the due diligence principle posterior to 
the Hague Conference,  eventually,  some achievements  have been accomplished. 
Yet, all of them in special international regimes.35 A general rule of due diligence has 
not been codified so far. Not that due diligence has not been discussed in the context 
of State responsibility since the Hague Codification Conference. It has. Even in 1999, 
only  two  years  before  the  United  Nations  International  Law  Commission 
(hereinafter  ILC)  adopted  the  Draft  Articles  on  Responsibility  of  States  for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts36 (hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
or  Draft  Articles),  which  are  generally  considered  as  reflecting  customary 
international law,37 the ILC was still considering to include due diligence in the Draft 
Articles.38
Nevertheless, James Crawford, the ILC Special Rapporteur on the issue of the State 
responsibility in 1999 (also in 2001), took a stance that “defining the precise nature of 
due diligence could not be done in the context of the draft articles without spending many 
more years on the topic and, even if the problem were resolved, that would in effect be based 
on the presumption that any primary rule, or a certain class of primary rules, contained a 
35 FRENCH, Duncan (Chair) and Tim STEPHENS (Rapporteur). ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in 
International Law, First Report. 2014.
36 International  Law  Commission,  Draft  Articles  on  Responsibility  of  States  for  Internationally  
Wrongful Acts, New York and Geneva:  Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II, part 2, 
2001  also  published  as  an  annex  to  United  Nations  General  Assembly  Resolution  56/83  on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, A/56/10. 12 December 2001.
37 The United States and China oppose this opinion. See  TIKK, Eneken. Will Cyber Consequences 
Deepen Disagreement on International Law.  Temple International & Comparative Law Journal, 2018, 
vol. 32, no. 2. note 8.
38 International Law Commission, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of 
its  fifty-first  session. Yearbook  of  the  International  Law  Commission 1999, Volume  II,  Part  2, 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1999/Add.l (Part 2). New York and Geneva, 2003. p. 59.
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qualification of due diligence.”39 The due diligence principle was just too complex and 
too controversial to be included in the final version of the Draft Articles in 2001. As a 
consequence, the Draft Articles avoided the use of term due diligence completely.40
The ILC commentary to the Draft Articles explained the ILC’s decision in this regard 
as follows: “[t]he articles lay down no general rule… [on] some degree of fault, culpability,  
negligence or want of due diligence. Such standards vary from one context to another for 
reasons which essentially relate to the object and purpose of the treaty provision or other  
rule giving rise to the primary obligation.”41 And as the Draft Articles focus exclusively 
on  secondary  rules,42 they  do  not  provide  any  primary  rule  establishing  a  due 
diligence obligation. Therefore, one must look somewhere else to identify primary 
rules establishing due diligence obligations.
Such rules exist  in special  international regimes. Besides,  there is also a general 
customary due diligence obligation. I make a short reference to both types of rules 
in the following two sections. Obligations emanating from these rules are binding 
and their violation (by omission) together with their attribution to a State constitute 
two elements of an internationally wrongful act under Article 2 of the Draft Articles.  
Therefore,  the  exclusion  of  the  due  diligence  principle  from  the  Draft  Articles 
cannot  be  understood  as  it  was  meant  to  impede  the  constitution  of  State 
responsibility on the basis of due diligence.
1.3 General due diligence obligation under international customary 
law
The due diligence principle has been well reflected and formed by State practice and 
case-law throughout many years since Alabama Claims. Due to its long-time use and 
39 Ibid., p. 86.
40 ILA Study Group on Due Diligence, First Report, supra note 35. pp. 4-5.
41 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 36. Commentary to Article 2, para. 3.
42 ILA Study Group on Due Diligence, First Report, supra note 35. p. 5.
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general acceptance, it became applicable under customary international law.43 From 
the principle derives a general obligation applicable under international customary 
law. It is commonly acknowledged that this obligation was best articulated in Corfu 
Channel as “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other States.”44
According to Schmitt, the due diligence principle as a general principle is applicable 
in particular contexts without further need of the recognition of its applicability. If a 
State does not accept the applicability in the context of a particular international 
regime, it  has to exclude it  by its  practice or  opinio juris.45 This  ensures  that  in 
cyberspace,  where  the  application  of  international  law  as  a  whole  is  widely 
accepted,46 States have a general due diligence obligation (as defined in the  Corfu 
Channel judgment) unless they expressively exclude it.47 This view is also endorsed 
in Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the international law applicable to cyber operations.48
The  applicability  of  the  due  diligence  principle  in  the  cyber  context  was  also 
recognized by the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security in its 
report to the United Nations General Assembly in 2013. The Group held the view that 
“international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty apply to State conduct of  
ICT-related activities, and to their jurisdiction over ICT [information and communication 
43 ILA Study Group on Due Diligence, Second Report, supra note 15. p. 5.
44 Corfu Channel, supra note 13. p. 22.
45 SCHMITT, Michael N. In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace. The Yale Law Journal Forum, 
2015. p. 73.
46 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in 
the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Sixty-eighth 
session, A/68/98, 24 June 2013.
United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the 
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Seventieth session, A/
70/174, 22 July 2015.
47 SCHMITT. In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, supra note 45.  p. 73.
48 Tallinn manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 6, paras 3-4.
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technology] infrastructure within their territory.”49 This view was endorsed by the same 
body in 2015.50
1.4 Special due diligence obligations applicable in special 
international law regimes
Some special international law regimes establish their own particular due diligence 
obligations applicable only within those regimes. Where such obligations exist, their 
application  takes  precedence  over  the  general  obligation  mentioned  above.51 
Historically the due diligence principle was applied many times in various contexts. 
Since  the  historical  cases,  where  it  was  applied  in  the  context  of  international 
humanitarian law (Alabama Claims) and in the context of protection of civilians in 
foreign  territories  (Janes  v.  Mexico or  Sambiaggio  case),  due  diligence  has  been 
drawing  more  and  more  attention  with  newly  emerging  special  international 
regimes.  The most apparent example of the current growth of its importance is, 
without any doubt, international environmental law.52
Industrial activities often pose risks for the environment of neighboring States. Such 
risks  are  usually  predictable  and  therefore,  States  have  a  special  due  diligence 
obligation based on the principle of prevention to “use all the means at its disposal in 
order  to  avoid  activities  which  take  place  in  its  territory,  or  in  any  area  under  its  
jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of another State.”53 Where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage to the environment, States are 
obliged to go even further in the protection of other States’ environment and apply 
precautionary approach by taking cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
49 UN GGE 2013 Report, supra note 46. para. 20.
50 UN GGE 2015 Report, supra note 46. para. 27. 
51 ILA Study Group on Due Diligence, Second Report, supra note 15. p. 6.
52 Case-law of international environmental law related to the due diligence principle is to be found in 
the chapter 6.
53 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, pp. 14 - 107. 
para. 205.
15
degradation  even  if  there  is  not  full  scientific  certainty  about  the  threats.  The 
precautionary approach was articulated in the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development.54
Besides the international environmental law, the due diligence principle has been 
applied, for instance, in international law of the sea in relation to the protection of 
the marine environment.55 In 2011, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
examined  the  legal  nature  of  States’  obligation  to  ensure  that  their  contractors 
conducting seabed mining activities  comply  with their  obligations to  protect  the 
marine environment.  It  concluded that  this  obligation is  a  special  due diligence 
obligation of conduct.56
The researchers of the International Law Association note that the concept of due 
diligence is also relevant in international human rights law, where it is associated, 
inter  alia,  with  States’  obligations to  reduce  or  eliminate  violations  of  individual 
rights by non-state actors (for instance, within the family or within employment). In 
some cases, the State’s failure to protect the rights of individuals may constitute its 
responsibility (for the failure to act, not for the violation itself).57 
Furthermore, due diligence is also widely applied in international investment law, 
where exist several standards laying down obligations to protect foreign investments 
and investors. The investment-related due diligence obligations are based on three 
‘objective standards of treatment’ composed of full protection and security standard, 
international minimum standard, and fair and equitable treatment.58 The protection 
States are obliged to provide to the investments and investors under these standards 
ranges from the physical to legal protection.
54 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Enviroment 
and Development. 1992. Principle 15.
55 ILA Study Group on Due Diligence, First Report, supra note 35. p. 29.
56 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the 
Area, 1 February 2011, Seabed Dispute Chamber of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, 
Case No. 17. paras. 99 – 120.
57 ILA Study Group on Due Diligence, First Report, supra note 35. p. 16. 
58 ILA Study Group on Due Diligence, First Report, supra note 35. p. 6.
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2 Specific benefits of the application of the due diligence 
principle in cyberspace
The application of a principle requiring more respect and protection to other States’  
rights  might,  in  general  terms,  contribute  to  mutual  respect  of  States  and, 
consequently, to the enhancement of international stability in cyberspace. Besides, 
there are more specific benefits the application of the due diligence principle might 
contribute with. An adequate application of the principle might help State victims in 
dealing  with two significant  dilemmas international  law  applicable  in  peacetime 
faces in relation to malicious cyber operations. These dilemmas are the attribution 
problem and the strong influence of malicious non-state actors backed by States.
2.1 Mitigation of the attribution problem
A  very  enticing  argument  in  favor  of  the  refinement  and  endorsement  of  the 
application of the due diligence principle in cyberspace is that it could help mitigate 
the  most  troublesome  dilemma  of  public  international  law  in  cyberspace  –  the 
attribution  problem. The  attribution of  a  cyber  operation to  a  State  requires,  in 
short,  “to  identify  with  reasonable  certainty  the  actors  and their  association  with  the 
State.”59 It is conditioned on a time-consuming, technically demanding process. Even 
though recent developments indicate that the attribution of cyber operations will 
likely  occur  more  often,60 the  attribution  problem  still  poses  a  huge  practical 
obstacle for the application of the law of State responsibility and for the effective 
and justified  resort  to  self-help  remedies.  Some  highly  sophisticated  operations, 
59 Kenneth P. Yeager v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 2 November 1987, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Award 
No. 324-10199-1. 
60 MAČÁK, Kubo. Decoding Article 8 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State 
Responsibility: Attribution of Cyber Operations by Non-State Actors. Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law, 2016, vol. 21, no. 3. p. 410.
See also comments on the attribution of cyber operations against Georgia in the subsection 5.3.1 of 
this thesis.
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such  as  Stuxnet,61 are  even  technically  impossible  to  attribute  to  a  State  in  a 
reasonable time, if ever. This enables States to “plausibly deny” their participation in 
the operations. In contrast, the attribution of conduct constituting a breach of the 
due  diligence  obligation  is  much  less  demanding.62 It  does  not  require  the 
identification  of  the  direct  perpetrator,  nor  proof  of  the  association  of  the 
perpetrator to the territorial State. Even though the application of the due diligence 
principle cannot put an end to the culture of plausible deniability, it represents an 
alternative for the target States incapable of timely identification of the perpetrator.
As concerns the attribution of a cyber operation, the major problem arises from the 
necessity of the identification of the perpetrator of the cyber operation. To identify a 
perpetrator and subsequently attribute its conduct to a State requires undertaking an 
in-depth,  time-consuming,  and technically  complicated  investigation  resulting  in 
the acquisition of reliable evidence. As the attributing States do not have to publicly 
expose the evidence proving the attribution, the evaluation of the reliability of the 
evidence would be up to consideration of each State attributing the operation in 
concern. However, States should count with the possibility of a subsequent litigation 
and an assessment of the evidence by a judicial organ.
The ICJ has employed different standards of proof in the proceedings before it and it  
remains unclear what standard of proof should be met in order to satisfy it.63 Roscini 
suggests  that  the  standard  of  proof  likely  to  be  employed  in  relation  to  the 
attribution  of  the  operations  qualified  as  use  of  force  would  be  “clear  and 
convincing” evidence standard noting that “a prima facie or preponderance of evidence 
standard might lead to specious claims and false or erroneous attribution, while a beyond 
61 Stuxnet is a malware that was used to malfunction controlling systems of centrifuges in Iranian 
nuclear facilities in Natanz in 2010. It is considered to be the first “cyber weapon” in the world.
62 Indeed, State responsibility cannot arise without attribution. Under the law on State responsibility, 
if a State is alleged of breaching its due diligence obligation, there has to be its behavior constitutes 
the breach of the obligation attributable to it. The attributed behavior of the State in relation to the 
due diligence principle would be its omission to act in order to protect other States’ rights.
63 H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of the International Court of Justice, Speech to the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly, 2 November 2007.
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reasonable  doubt  standard  would  be  unrealistic.”64 The  standard of  proof  may vary 
according to the seriousness of the operation to be attributed.65 Nevertheless, the 
concerns related to  the false  attribution surround any cyber operation,  not  only 
those reaching the threshold of use of force. Cyberspace is an especially predisposed 
environment  to  hasty  false  attributions  because  it  enables  the  use  of  identity-
obscuring  techniques  like  IP  spoofing,  onion  routing,  and  the  use  of  botnets. 
Therefore, the standard of proof must protect States from false attribution, and it 
should not be lowered only because the attribution is complicated.
The standard of proof related to the alleged breach of the due diligence obligation is  
equally uncertain. However, what is certain is that the attribution requirements in 
the  case  of  attribution  of  lack  of  diligence  are  lower  than  those  related  to  the 
attribution of malicious cyber operations. The identity of the perpetrator can remain 
unknown to the target State as well as the existence and degree of the involvement 
of the non-diligent State in the execution of the operation. What has to be proved in  
the case of the due diligence is the use of a State territory (or the use of networks and 
devices under its control), its knowledge of the cyber operation violating the target 
State’s rights and, of course, its omission to take all measures available to it to put an 
end to the operation.
If a malicious operation were on-going, the knowledge of the territorial State could 
be easily established and later proved by the notification of the target State to the 
territorial State of the situation. In response, if the territorial State was not aware of  
it before receiving the notification, it could either confirm the involvement of its 
territory  in  the  operation  violating  the  target  State’s  rights  and take  all  feasible 
measures to put an end to the operation, or ignore the notification, or deny the use 
of its territory. In the two latter cases, the target State could take countermeasures to 
64 ROSCINI, Marco. Evidentiary Issues in International Disputes Related to State Responsibility for 
Cyber Operations. Texas International Law Journal, 2015, vol. 50, no. 2-3, p. 252.
65 The Netherlands: International law in cyberspace, supra note 108. p. 7.
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induce the territorial State to comply with the due diligence obligation66 if the use of 
the  territorial  State’s  territory  in  the  malicious  cyber  operation  remained 
conclusive.67
In  conclusion,  the  application  of  the  due  diligence  principle  could  mitigate  the 
attribution  dilemma,  particularly  in  the  cases  of  on-going  operations  when  the 
identity  of  the perpetrator is  difficult  to  ascertain,  yet  it  would be clear that  the 
perpetrator operates from a defined State’s  territory or uses its infrastructure. In 
such cases, the territorial State has an obligation to take all feasible measures to put 
an end to the malicious operation. If it failed to do so, the target State could resort to 
self-help. However, self-help remedies the target State could resort to are limited to 
countermeasures that must not reach the threshold of threat or use of force. Resorts 
to self-defense are only allowed after a prior attribution of the cyber operation.
Moreover,  the  due  diligence  principle  enables  target  States  to  overcome  the 
evidentiary  hurdle  caused  by  the  strict  requirement  on  the  identification  of 
perpetrator  and its  association  with  the territorial  State.68 Holding the  territorial 
State  responsible  for,  at  least,  failure  of  the  due  diligence  obligation  is  less 
demanding  as  it  requires  evidence  “only”  on  the  use  of  State  territory  or  its 
infrastructure, its knowledge of the malicious operation, and violation of the target 
State’s rights.
2.2 Denial of safe havens of non-state actors
With the rapid development of information and communication technologies and 
their omnipresent use, non-state actors gain greater and greater influence in the 
transnational context. While some private entities are in the front line of the cyber  
battlefield  securing  the  safety  of  critical  infrastructure  of  States,  cyberspace  is, 
66 After its prior notification of decision to take countermeasures. See ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, supra note 36. Article 52.
67 SCHMITT. In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, supra note 45. p. 79.
68 Ibid., p. 80.
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sadly, also a perfect environment for the expansion of criminal groups as well as 
politically motivated non-state actors. Most of cyber operations are not demanding 
financially,  nor  personally.  This  allows  non-states  actors  to  conduct  hostile 
operations  with  massive  impact  without  being  dependent  on  active  State 
sponsorship. Indeed, some malicious cyber activities of non-state actors are actively 
sponsored  by  States  and  carried  out  under  a  State’s  instructions,  direction,  or 
control. Accordingly, these activities would be attributable to a State under the law 
of State responsibility. Consequently, they are covered by the previous section on 
the attribution problem. In this section, I address the malicious operations of non-
state actors passively sponsored by States.
Transforming Byman’s concept of passive sponsorship of terrorist groups69 into the 
cyber context, Maurer suggests that States passively sponsor non-state actors when 
they “simply choose not to prevent the non-state actors' activity, in spite of being aware of 
the specific operation and capable of stopping it directly or at least warning the victim, 
presumably because the state perceives that it can benefit from the activity.”70 Moreover, 
the passive sponsorship includes “harboring” of non-state actors in situations when 
States are not aware of specific malicious cyber operations carried out by non-state 
actors, but they are aware of the fact that the non-state actors conduct malicious 
activities  from their  territories  and decide  to  ignore  this  fact.  By  doing  so,  they 
provide the non-state actors sanctuary (safe haven).71 Unlike terrorist groups who 
attempt  to  recruit  new  members,  acquire  weapons  etc.,  the  malicious  non-state 
actors operating in cyberspace need only the sanctuary, and of course, ICT devices. 
The  due  diligence  principle  cannot  provide  a  solution  eliminating  all  malicious 
activities of non-state actors in cyberspace. Where non-state actors operate without 
any knowledge of the territorial State of their activities, or where their operations 
69 BYMAN, Daniel. Passive Sponsors of Terrorism. Survival, 2005 – 2006, vol. 47 no. 4. p. 118.




are out  of  reach of territorial  States,  the due diligence principle  does not  apply.  
However, it  offers a solution for States targeted by cyber operations of non-state 
actors passively sponsored by territorial States. Under the due diligence principle, if 
a  State  is  aware  of  a  cyber  operation  carried  out  by  a  non-state  actor  from  its  
territory  that  violates  other  State’s  rights,72 it  must  take  all  feasible  measures  to 
terminate the operation. By failing to do so, it breaches its due diligence obligation. 
As a consequence of its breach, it commits an internationally wrongful act and can 
be held responsible for it.73
Moreover,  the breach of  the due diligence obligation permits  the target  State  to 
respond  in  compliance  with  international  law,  particularly  by  taking 
countermeasures. Therefore, the target State could use countermeasures against the 
territorial State to induce it to put an end to the operations of the non-state actor 
conducting  malicious  cyber  operations  from  its  territory.  In  addition,  Schmitt 
advocates that the countermeasures may be targeted directly against the non-state 
actor, instead of the territorial State in breach of the due diligence obligation.74 This 
view  is,  however,  not  without  controversies.75 More  details  on  the  topic  of 
countermeasures follow in section 6.2.
72 The violation of State’s right is one of the elements triggering the due diligence obligation. See the 
subsection 5.1.3. The element of violation of other States’ rights is of special importance in this 
context. It has to be emphasized that non-state actors that would infringe States’ interests causing 
mere inconveniences to the respective States do not violate States’ rights. Also, violations of national 
laws of the respective States are irrelevant for the sake of the application of the due diligence 
application in general. Therefore, this special preventive obligation would not relate, for instance, to 
journalist or human rights defenders based in territories of democratic States that criticize foreign 
non-democratic governments via online platforms.
73 SCHMITT. In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, supra note 45. p. 79. 
74 Ibid.
75 JENSEN, Eric T., WATTS Sean. A Cyber Duty of Due Diligence: Gentle Civilizer or Crude 
Destabilizer? Texas Law Review, 2017, vol. 95. p. 1563.
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3 Towards refinement of the due diligence principle in 
cyberspace
While  the  applicability  of  existing  norms  and  principles  of  international  law  in 
cyberspace is generally accepted, how international law should apply in the cyber 
context remains subject to debate. Academia contributed to the debate, particularly 
with the excellent work of two International Groups of Experts  that shared their 
views on the application of international law in the cyber context in Tallinn Manual 
and  Tallinn  Manual  2.0.  The  latter  includes  a  very  detailed  analysis  of  the 
application of the due diligence principle in two of its rules (Rule 6 and Rule 7). 
Although Tallinn Manuals are impressive pieces of work, they do not represent a 
view of any State,  but  rather views of independent experts  acting solely in their  
personal capacity.
An essential debate related to the application of international law is taking place 
within two working groups of the United Nations between representatives of States. 
These two working groups are subject to sections 4.1 and 4.2. One of the groups was 
established very recently, and it did not produce any outcome so far. The other one 
managed  to  produce  valuable  reports  concerning  the  general  applicability  of 
international law in cyberspace, but they remained somewhat superficial as to the 
approach to the application of specific norms and principles. Due to the slowness of 
the processes within the United Nations and the generality of their outcomes, some 
States decided to publicly deliver their own respective views on the application of 
specific  norms  and  principles  in  cyberspace.  Some  of  these  declarations  even 
included  detailed  views  on  the  application  of  the  due  diligence  principle  in 
cyberspace. These views are introduced in the section 4.3.
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3.1 United Nations Group of Governmental Experts
Cybersecurity in the broad sense was on the agenda of the United Nations General 
Assembly since 1998.76 After a few years of promoting multilateral cooperation on 
the issue, the General Assembly on a proposal of the Russian Federation77 requested 
Secretary-General to study concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global 
information  and  telecommunications  systems  with  the  assistance  of  a  group  of 
governmental experts.78 The group was established in 2004, and it was named United 
Nations  Group  of  Governmental  Experts  on  Developments  in  the  Field  of 
Information  and  Telecommunications  in  the  Context  of  International  Security 
(hereinafter UN GGE). It comprised representatives of the five permanent members 
of the Security Council and, in addition, ten more representatives appointed by then 
Secretary-General  on  the  basis  of  equitable  geographical  distribution. 
Unfortunately, the first UN GGE was not able to produce any consensus report.79 
Another  UN GGE  was  established  in  2009.  This  one  was  more  successful  and it 
eventually did deliver a final report to the General Assembly.80 However, the report 
was very superficial and it did not introduce anything noteworthy as concerns due 
diligence.
The work of the following UN GGE was more productive. In its report issued in 2013, 
the UN GGE recognized the applicability of principles flowing from sovereignty in 
the cyber context by stating that “international norms and principles that flow from 
76 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 53/70, Developments in the field of information and 
telecommunications in the context of international security, A/RES/53/70. 4 December 1998.
77 United Nations: Recent Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the 
Context of International Security. INCYDER [online]. Available from https://ccdcoe.org/incyder-
articles/united-nations-recent-developments-in-the-field-of-information-and-telecommunications-in-
the-context-of-international-security/#footnote_3_2548. 
78 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 58/32, Developments in the field of information and 
telecommunications in the context of international security, A/RES/58/32. 8 December 2003. pp. 2-3.
79 The UN GGE on Cybersecurity: What is the UN’s role? Council on Foreign Relations [online], 15 April 
2015. Available from https://www.cfr.org/blog/un-gge-cybersecurity-what-uns-role.
80 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments 
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, 
A/65/201. 30 July 2010.
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sovereignty apply to State conduct of ICT-related activities, and to their jurisdiction over 
ICT infrastructure within their territory.”81 This view was endorsed by the same body 
in  2015.82 The  due  diligence  principle  is  one  of  the  principles  that  flow  from 
sovereignty.  Consequently,  this applicability recognition relates,  inter alia,  to the 
due diligence principle.83
Furthermore, the 2013 UN GGE report reflected the due diligence principle in one of 
the non-binding recommendations the group agreed on, saying that “States should 
seek to ensure that their territories are not used by non-State actors for unlawful use of  
ICTs.”84 In 2015, the following UN GGE broadened the 2013 non-state-actor focused 
scope of the recommendation by holding that “States should not knowingly allow their 
territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs.”85 The wording of the 
recommendation of 2015 UN GGE was clearly inspired by the Corfu Channel dictum.86 
Beyond the scope of the original  Corfu Channel dictum, the 2015 recommendation 
includes only a cyber-context feature, which is the inclusion of the ICT elements 
enabling the commission of internationally wrongful acts.
While the work of the UN GGEs and the two recommendations show goodwill of 
States in relation to the refinement of due diligence application in cyberspace, the 
outcome is somewhat weak. The recommendations87 did not address any specific 
legal  aspects emanating from the nature of  cyberspace and their  vague wording 
indicates a  hesitant  approach of  the UN GGEs to the issue.88 Another attempt to 
refine due diligence in cyberspace came with the UN GGE active in 2016–2017. This 
time, however, the UN GGE failed altogether because it was not able to submit a 
81 UN GGE 2013 Report, supra note 46. para. 20.
82 UN GGE 2015 Report, supra note 46. para. 27. 
83 Tallinn manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 6, para 3.
84 UN GGE 2013 Report, supra note 46. para. 23.
85 UN GGE 2015 Report, supra note 46. paras. 13 (c), 28 (e).
86 See Corfu Channel, supra note 13. p. 22. Note that instead of using formulation acts contrary to the 
rights of other States, the UN GGE used the expression internationally wrongful acts employing the 
terminology of the Draft Articles.
87 UN GGE 2015 Report, supra note 46. para. 13.
88 SCHMITT. In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, supra note 45. p. 73.
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final report to the General Assembly due to disagreements on some controversial 
issues  between  the  members.89 The  eventual  failure  is  particularly  regrettable, 
considering the progress that had been made before the process failed. For instance, 
in  relation  to  due  diligence,  the  States  agreed  on  the  content  of  the  knowledge 
requirement. The UN GGE also sought to take action against non-state actors using 
States’ infrastructure for malicious purposes.90
After the failure of UN GGE in 2017, some commentators thought that the UN GGE 
process came to its end, and the international community had to find an alternative 
platform to discuss  the international  norms applicable  to  cyberspace.91 This  was 
only  partially  true.  The  United  States  did  not  want  to  give  up  on  the  UN  GGE 
mechanism. One year later, it proposed to the General Assembly to set up another 
UN GGE. On 8 November 2018, the United Nations First Committee (Disarmament 
and  International  Security)  of  the  General  Assembly  adopted  the  resolution 
A/C.1/73/L.37 sponsored by the United States. On the basis of this resolution, a new 
UN GGE was created in 2019. Unlike the previous expert groups, this one seeks to 
collaborate with relevant regional international organizations and also hold open-
ended informal consultative meetings with all Member States of the United Nations 
willing to share their views. The process now underway, and the final session of this 
UN GGE is scheduled on May 2021. The question is whether this group will be able to 
agree on a final report enhancing the acceptable application of international norms 
in cyberspace like its predecessors did in 2013 and 2015.
89 SUKUMAR, Arun M. The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in Cyberspace Doomed As Well?. 





3.2 United Nations Open-Ended Working Group
The US-sponsored resolution was not the only important cyber-related resolution 
the UN First Committee of the General Assembly adopted on 8 November 2018.92 
There  was  one  more  tabled  by  the  Russian  Federation.  The  second  resolution 
(A/C.1/73/L.27.Rev.1)93 aimed  to  convene  an  open-ended  group  working  group 
(hereinafter OEWG) acting on a consensus basis “to further develop the rules, norms 
and principles of responsible behavior of States.”94 By “further” it is referred to the 
fact that the work of OEWG should build upon the recommendations of the reports 
of  the  UN  GGEs.  Nonetheless,  some  State  delegations  that  voted  against  the 
resolution alleged that the UN GGE reports reflected in the resolution were “cherry-
picked”95 and the resolution includes selected excerpts from reports that distort their 
meaning.96 As regards specifically the wording of the due diligence principle, it was 
left in the original wording of the 2015 UN GGE recommendation.
According to the resolution, the OEWG should be more democratic, inclusive and 
transparent as it comprises of all the Member State of the United Nations97 and it 
provides  the  possibility  of  holding consultative  meetings  with  interested  parties, 
namely business, non-governmental organizations and academia, to share views on 
the issues within the group’s mandate.98 This inclusive and transparent policy has 
92 GUPTA, Arvind. A Tale of two UN Resolutions on Cyber-security. Vivekananda International 
Foundation [online]. 29 April 2019. Available from https://www.vifindia.org/2019/april/24/a-tale-of-
two-un-resolutions-on-cyber-security.
93 Available online from https://undocs.org/A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1. 
94 The United Nations First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) of the General 
Assembly, Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international 
security, A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1. 29 October 2018. para. 5.
95 Statement of representative of Canada in First Committee Approves 27 Texts, Including 2 
Proposing New Groups to Develop Rules for States on Responsible Cyberspace Conduct. United 
Nations Meetings Coverage [online]. Available from 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/gadis3619.doc.htm. 
96 Ibid.
97 In the First Committee meeting, the Russian representative introduced the Resolution 
A/C.1/73/L.27.Rev.1 by saying that “[t]he practice of some ‘club agreements‘ should be sent into the 
annals of history” referring to the UN GGE process.
98 The United Nations First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) of the General 
Assembly, Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international 
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already  been  turned  into  action.  From  2  to  4  December  2019,  an  intersessional 
meeting  of  OEWG  with  the  participation  of  industry,  non-governmental 
organizations and academia was held.99
The  democratic  character  noticeably  lies  in  the  participation  of  all  the  Member 
States of the United Nations. While the mere fact that all  States are welcomed to 
participate in the OEWG is commendable, it raises doubts about the capacity of the 
OEWG  to  come  to  an  agreement  on  more  than  merely  superficial  issues.  The 
outcome should be known in July 2020 (and if successful, it will be submitted to the 
General Assembly in its 75th session in September 2020). Nevertheless, it may happen 
that the whole process will be prolonged due to the situation related to the spread of 
Coronavirus  Disease  (COVID-19),  which  is  particularly  worrisome  in  New  York, 
where the meetings of the OEWG take place.
Not only the difficulty of reaching consensus due to the broad participation States 
raises concerns about the OEWG mechanism. Some States consider the setting up of 
the  Russian-proposed  working  group  with  a  similar  mandate  to  that  of 
simultaneously existing UN GGE as an attempt to promote extensive State control 
over  ICT infrastructure enabling mass  surveillance and censorship.100 For a  long 
time, Russia, together with other like-minded States, is trying to promote such an 
approach  towards  domestic  ICT  infrastructures.  These  efforts  are  repeatedly 
criticized because of the negative impacts an extensive State control over ICTs could 
have on human rights and the freedom of the Internet.
security, A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1. 29 October 2018. para. 5.
99 Informal intersessional consultative meeting of the OEWG with industry, non-governmental 
organizations and academia (2-4 December 2019). United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 
[online]. Available from https://www.un.org/disarmament/oewg-informal-multi-stakeholder-
meeting-2-4-december-2019/. 
100 DE TOMAS COLATIN, S. A surprising turn of events: UN creates two working groups on 




From  the  strict  due  diligence  point  of  view,  increased  monitoring  of  an  ICT 
infrastructure implies a gathering of more information about ongoing operations in 
the infrastructure.  More timely information enables  States  to  enhance their  due 
diligence  practice.101 According  to  the  resolution  that  convened  the  OEWG,  the 
enhancement  of  due  diligence  is  a  priority  task  for  the  OEWG.102 The  diligent 
behavior of States firmly controlling their infrastructures towards other States would 
signify  more  international  security.  That  is  the  theoretical  pro-due-diligence-
positioned way to read the demands for strengthening the domestic control. More 
realistically,  as  noted  above,  Russia  and  its  supporters  aim  to  advance  their 
surveillance  and  censorship  capacity.  Diligent  behavior  with  the  objective  of 
protecting other States probably was not their primary aspiration. 
The resolution that convened the OEWG set as the primary goal of the OEWG work 
the development of international rules, norms and principles of responsible State 
behavior elaborated in the UN GGE recommendations, including due diligence, and 
the ways for their implementation. As stated in the resolution, reaching that goal 
may also be achieved by the introduction of changes to them. While the adoption of 
the  setting  up  of  the  OEWG  was  accompanied  by  skeptical  voices,  it  will  be 
interesting to observe where the OEWG process, along with the UN GGE process, 
will lead to.
So far, two of the three substantive sessions took place. Interestingly, during the 
second substantive session held in February 2020, seven States delivered statements 
addressing the issue of how international law applies to the use of information and 
communications technologies by States.103 Three of them also addressed specifically 
101 Insufficient of control over cyber infrastructures is often used as an excuse for non-application of 
due diligence.
102 The United Nations First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) of the General 
Assembly, Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of 
international security, A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1. 29 October 2018. para 5.
103 The statements are available from https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/ga/oewg-on-icts/2020-2nd-
substantive-session/agenda/5/5d/. 
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the  due  diligence  principle.  Brazil  endorsed  the  application  of  the  principle  in 
cyberspace  and  furthermore  emphasized  that  the  principle  should  be  applied 
flexibly,  respecting  different  national  capabilities.  Finland  also  expressed  its 
support,  noting that the principle of  due diligence is “particularly  pertinent in the 
cyber environment.”
Lastly, the delegation of Argentina stressed that the application of the principle of 
due  diligence  should  be  adjusted  to  the  special  characteristics  of  cyberspace. 
Interestingly, it suggested that the application of the due diligence principle should 
consist  exclusively  of  the assistance of  territorial  States  provided to target  States 
whose  critical  infrastructures  were  targeted  by  malicious  cyber  operations.  The 
assistance would follow after a previous request of assistance of the target State and 
would  be  limited  to  the  only  purpose,  which  would  be  the  termination  of  the 
operations.
3.3 States’ declarations on the due diligence principle application
Regardless of the processes within the United Nations, some States decided to step 
up and express their opinions on how international law should apply in cyberspace 
from their national standpoints.  This could potentially lead to an acceleration of 
processes within the international mechanisms mentioned above, or potentially to 
their substitution. Where a broad agreement on particular issues would exist, even 
customary rules could arise – clearly, only with sufficient support in State practice.
As of March 2020, seven States have made their declarations on the application of 
international  law  in  the  context  of  cyberspace.  The  States  who  made  their 
declarations on the application of international law in cyberspace are Australia,104 
104 Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy. 2017. ISBN 978-1-74322-412-0.
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Estonia,105 France,106 Germany,107 the  Netherlands,108 United  Kingdom,109 and  the 
United  States.110 All  the  declarations  are  relatively  recent.  With  two  exceptions 
(Germany and the United States), all of them were delivered after the failure of the 
UN GGE process in 2017. Doubtlessly, more declarations will follow soon. Finland 
already announced that it is working on its own articulation on the topic.111 In three 
of the seven already articulated declarations, comprehensive reflections on the due 
diligence applications are to be found. As Finland already addressed the topic of due 
diligence, calling it “particularly pertinent in the cyber environment,”112 it  is very 
likely that its reflection will follow. In addition, one declaration, the Estonian, does 
not  include  a  detailed  view  on  the  due  diligence  principle,  but  it  endorses  its  
application by holding that “states have to make reasonable efforts to ensure that their 
territory is not used to adversely affect the rights of other states.”113
First  State,  which  expressed  its  detailed  view  on  the  due  diligence  principle  in 
cyberspace, was Australia in 2017. In its opinion:
105 President of the Republic at the opening of CyCon 2019. President of Estonia [online], 29 May 2019. 
Available from https://www.president.ee/en/official-duties/speeches/15241-president-of-the-republic-
at-the-opening-of-cycon-2019/index.html.
106 Ministère des Armées. International law applied to operations in cyberspace. 2019.
107 “Cyber Security as a Dimension of Security Policy”. Speech by Ambassador Norbert Riedel, 
Commissioner for International Cyber Policy, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, at Chatham House, 
London. Federal Foreign Office [online], 18 May 2015. Available from https://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/en/newsroom/news/150518-ca-b-chatham-house/271832.
108 Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2019, Appendix: International law in cyberspace 
to the letter of 5 July 2019 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the President of the House of 
Representatives on the international legal order in cyberspace. 26 September 2019.
109 United Kingdom Attorney General's Office. Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century [online]. 
23 May 2018. Available from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-
in-the-21st-century.
110 EGAN, Brian J. International Law and Stability in Cyberspace. Berkeley Law, 10 November 2016.
111 Statementby Ambassador Janne Taalas at the second session of the open-ended Working Group 
(OEWG) on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of 
international security, 10 and 11 February 2020. 
112 Ibid.




To the extent that a state enjoys the right to exercise sovereignty over objects 
and  activities  within  its  territory,  it  necessarily  shoulders  corresponding 
responsibilities to ensure those objects and activities are not used to harm other 
states.  In  this  context,  we note  it  may not  be reasonable  to  expect  (or  even 
possible for) a state to prevent all malicious use of ICT infrastructure located 
within  its  territory.  However,  in  Australia’s  view,  if  a  state  is  aware  of  an 
internationally wrongful act originating from or routed through its territory, and 
it has the ability to put an end to the harmful activity,  that state should take 
reasonable steps to do so consistent with international law.114
There  are  two  crucial  aspects  Australia  expressed  in  its  view.  First,  that  the 
prevention of all the malicious use of ICT infrastructure located in a State’s territory 
would be unreasonable to expect  (if  not  directly  impossible).  And second, when 
acknowledging that a State should take reasonable steps to put an end to the ongoing 
harmful activity that it is aware of, it said that the internationally wrongful act that is 
underway can either originate from the State’s territory or can be routed through it.
France was the second State that made a commentary of the due diligence principle. 
It came in September 2019 in a very comprehensive document called “International 
Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace” published by the French Ministry of the 
Armies (Ministry of Defense).
France  exercises  its  sovereignty  over  the  information  systems  located  on  its 
territory. In compliance with the due diligence requirement, it ensures that its 
territory  is  not  used  for  internationally  wrongful  acts  using  ICTs.  This  is  a 
customary obligation for States, which must (i) use cyberspace in compliance 
with international law, and in particular not use proxies to commit acts which, 
using ICTs, infringe the rights of other States, and (ii) ensure that their territory 
is not used for such purposes, including by non-state actors.115
114 Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy, supra note 104. p. 91.
115 France: International law applied to operations in cyberspace, supra note 106. p. 6.
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In accordance with the due diligence principle, “States should not knowingly 
allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs”, 
including acts  that  infringe the territorial  integrity  or  sovereignty of  another 
State.  In  addition,  States  must  ensure  that  non-state  actors  do  not  use  their  
territory  to  carry  on  such  activities,  and  not  use  proxies  to  commit 
internationally wrongful acts using ICTs.116
In the first cited paragraph, France expressed its strong support for the application 
of  the  due  diligence  principle  in  cyberspace  and,  in  fact,  identified  cyber  due 
diligence as a customary international obligation. In the second cited paragraph, it 
specified the content  of  this  obligation in  its  view  by  quoting  the  2015  UN GGE 
recommendation and adding that the internationally wrongful acts that should not 
be  allowed  to  be  carried  out  include  infringement  of  the  territorial  integrity  or 
sovereignty of other State. It is noteworthy that, in the French perspective, the act 
that constitutes a breach of sovereignty is “[a]ny cyberattack against  French digital 
systems or any effects produced on French territory by digital means by a State organ, a 
person or an entity exercising elements of governmental authority or by a person or persons 
acting on the instructions of or under the direction or control of a State .”117 The French 
understanding of due diligence in cyberspace is, therefore, remarkably extensive.
So far, the last declaration addressing the application of the due diligence principle 
in cyberspace was delivered by the Netherlands, also in September 2019. The Dutch 
government  first  emphasized that  it  regards  “the  principle  [of  due  diligence]  as  an 
obligation  in  its  own  right,  the  violation  of  which  may  constitute  an  internationally 
wrongful act.”118 Then it introduced of what elements the due diligence principle in 
the context of cyberspace encompasses in its view and set forth an example of the 
application of the principle.
116 Ibid., p. 10.
117 Ibid., p. 7.
118 The Netherlands: International law in cyberspace, supra note 108. p. 4.
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In the context of cyberspace, the due diligence principle requires that states take 
action in respect of cyber activities:
- carried out by persons in their territory or where use is made of items or 
networks that are in their territory or which they otherwise control;
- that violate a right of another state; and
- whose existence they are, or should be, aware of.
To this end a state must take measures which, in the given circumstances, may 
be expected of a state acting in a reasonable manner. It is not relevant whether 
the cyber  activity  in question is  carried out  by a  state or  non-state  actor,  or 
where this actor is located. If, for example, a cyberattack is carried out against 
the Netherlands using servers in another country, the Netherlands may, on the 
basis  of  the due diligence principle,  ask the other  country to  shut  down the 
servers,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  it  has  been  established  that  a  state  is 
responsible for the cyberattack.
It is generally accepted that the due diligence principle applies only if the state 
whose  right  or  rights  have  been  violated  suffers  sufficiently  serious  adverse 
consequences. The precise threshold depends on the specific circumstances of 
the case. It is clear, however, that such adverse consequences do not necessarily 
have to include physical damage.119
The Netherlands’ declaration is definitely the most precise one. In contrast to the 
perspectives of Australia and France, the Netherlands broadened the scope of the 
application  of  the  due  diligence  principle  from  the  infrastructures  located  in  a 
State’s  territory  to  the  items  and  networks  which  it  otherwise  control outside  its 
territory. Besides, the Netherlands was the only State which made a reference to the 
constructive knowledge standard by holding that the due diligence attaches not only 
when a State is actually aware of the existence of the malicious cyber activity, but 
also when it should be aware of it.
119 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
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The declarations were, to a great extent, focused on the determination of elements 
that trigger the due diligence obligation. After making their comparison, it seems 
that there are three elements all States included in their declarations. The first one is 
the involvement of State territory.120 The second element is the violation of a State’s 
rights. And the last one is actual knowledge. That means due diligence is triggered 
when a State becomes aware of malicious activity originating from its territory and 
violating other State’s rights.121
Unfortunately,  the overlap of  the articulations  found in the declarations suffices 
only to cover the general  customary due diligence obligation laid down in  Corfu 
Channel,  and its  slightly modified version in  the 2015 UN GGE recommendation. 
While there were not any disagreements on other aspects, many of them were left 
uncommented. As a consequence, beyond the elemental due diligence articulations 
(Corfu Channel and 2015 UN GGE recommendation), the common standpoint of the 
three States does not capture any cyber-specific issues the due diligence principle 
comes within the context of cyberspace, leaving all the controversies unresolved.
120 Moreover, Australia and the Netherlands broadened the scope of the application also to the 
infrastructure located outside of a State territory.
121 The Netherlands included also the constructive knowledge to its articulation.
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4 The Application of Due Diligence Principle in the cyber 
context
Being far from perfectly refined in the cyber context, the due diligence principle has 
been repeatedly recognized as applicable in cyberspace. Therefore, I now shift from 
overviewing of the interstate debates and position forming to a more practical issue 
– the analysis of the application of the due diligence principle. It is not my intention 
to  provide  exhausting  application  guidelines.  It  is  not  even  possible  to  do  that 
because  the  application  of  the  due  diligence  principle  is  too  circumstances-
dependent,  and cyberspace is  developing too rapidly.  Rather  I  will  focus  on the 
elements  triggering  the  due  diligence  obligation  and their  possible  adjustments, 
then on the content of the due diligence obligation when it gets triggered on the 
basis of the triggering elements and ultimately on the constitution of the breach of  
the due diligence obligation.
4.1 Elements triggering the due diligence obligation
Building upon the articulation of the due diligence principle in the 2015 UN GGE 
report,122 as well as all to-date available declarations of States on the application of  
the due diligence principle123 and the general articulation the due diligence principle 
in the case-law,124 I identified three elements triggering the due diligence obligation: 
(1) use of the territorial State’s territory or its cyber infrastructure in the malicious 
operation,  (2)  knowledge  the  territorial  State  has  of  a  cyber  operation  that  is 
supposed to be stopped (knowledge requirement), and (3) violation of other State’s 
rights.  While  it  is  indisputable  that  these  elements  trigger  the  due  diligence 
obligation, there are some important nuances in their content that deserve to be 
122 See section 4.1.
123 See section 4.3.
124 See chapter 1.
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commented on. Moreover, the application of the due diligence principle might be 
extended as well as restricted by certain adjustments to the three elements. Each of  
the three elements might be adjusted by one corresponding potential adjustment. 
Which of the adjustments will be used in practice, and how, depends on the further 
refinement efforts relating to the due diligence principle and State practice.
4.1.1Use of the State territory
The  involvement  of  a  State  territory  is  a  key  prerequisite  of  the  due  diligence 
obligation because it is the State territory where the State exercises its sovereignty, 
where its  cyber  infrastructure is  located and where it  is  obligated to ensure the 
protection of other States’ rights under the due diligence principle. In short, States 
are obligated to ensure that their territory is not used in cyber operations violating 
other  States’  rights.  The  territorial  element  is  inherently  connected  to  the  due 
diligence principle since the very beginning of its application in  Alabama Claims. 
Without any doubt, the involvement of a State territory is a fundamental indicator 
that the State in concern might owe the due diligence obligation. Nonetheless, the 
involvement of the State territory could not be the only indicator in this sense.
Extraterritoriality
The  Netherlands  proposed  in  its  declaration  to  extend  the  application  of  the 
obligation  to  the  items  and  networks  not  located  on  a  State  territory  that  are, 
nonetheless, under the State control.125 The International Group of Experts is of the 
same view, adding that the due diligence obligation should apply extraterritorially in 
two  cases.  First,  when  a  State  is  in  control  of  a territory  but  does  not  exercise 
sovereignty over it, which would be, for instance, the case of an annexation of a 
territory  or  an  occupation.126 Second,  when  a  State  controls  government  cyber 
125 The Netherlands: International law in cyberspace, supra note 108. p. 4.
126 Tallinn manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 6, para 9.
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infrastructure  located  on  a  territory  of  another  sovereign  State,  such  as  cyber 
infrastructures in diplomatic premises or military installations.127 
4.1.2Knowledge requirement
The due diligence obligation is triggered when a State has an actual knowledge of 
malicious use of its cyber infrastructure. In other words, once a State learns of a  
cyber  operation  causing  violation  of  another  State’s  rights,  the  due  diligence 
obligation triggers. This actual knowledge requirement is generally recognized as a 
basic condition for the attachment of the obligation by States,128 as well as the 2015 
UN GGE.129 While the substance of the requirement is not controversial, proving that 
the obliged State gained knowledge of an operation may cause trouble. The relevant 
evidence related to  the  actual  knowledge  is  usually  administered  by  the  obliged 
States, which makes it inaccessible for anyone else except the obliged State itself.130 
The only occasion when the evidentiary situation would be relatively favorable for 
the target State would occur if the target State notified the obliged State of the fact  
that its infrastructure was being used in an operation causing significant damage to 
the target State.131 The obliged State’s claims that it was unaware of the operation 
would be pointless because the target State could easily prove the opposite.
The knowledge element is based on the idea that holding States responsible for not 
putting  an  end  to  operations  they  could  not  have  any  knowledge  of  would  be 
unreasonable. Nevertheless, it should not be allowed to let the States be ignorant to  
misuses of their cyber infrastructures resulting in significant harm to other States. 
Therefore,  the  knowledge  requirement  should  also  be  satisfied  when  the 
127 Ibid., Rule 6, paras 10–12.
128 See section 4.3. 
129 See section 4.1. 
130 COUZIGOU, Irène. Securing cyber space: the obligation of States to prevent harmful international 
cyber operations, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, vol. 32, no. 1, 2018. DOI: 
10.1080/13600869.2018.1417763. p. 42.
LIU, Ian Y. State Responsibility and Cyberattacks: Defining Due Diligence Obligations. The Indonesian 
Journal of International & Comparative Law, 2017. ISSN 2338-7602. pp. 233 – 234.
131 Cf. Liu, supra note 130. p. 234–235.
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circumstances of the case leave no doubt that the State should have known that its 
cyber  infrastructure  was  used  to  cause  violation  of  other  State’s  rights.  Such 
construction  of  State  knowledge  would  be  possible  by  the  application  of  the 
constructive knowledge concept commented below.
Constructive knowledge
To avoid the ignorance of States related to misuses of their cyber infrastructures 
and,  more  importantly,  to  suppress  the culture  of  plausible  deniability,  the due 
diligence  obligation  should  attach  also  when  States  “should  have  known”  of 
malicious use of their cyber infrastructure. In this case, however, the due diligence 
obligation would not be “triggered”, because it would attach retrospectively. The use 
of this concept known as ‘constructive knowledge’ is supported by the IGE, which 
suggests that “if the factual circumstances are such that a State in the normal course of 
events would have become aware of said use, it is appropriate to constructively attribute 
knowledge to the State.”132 Liu also endorsed this view,133 and so did the Netherlands.134 
Other States did introduce neither positive nor negative views in this regard. 
The  determination  if  a  State  should  objectively  have  known  of  a  certain  cyber 
operation would have to be conducted by a judicial organ case-by-case.  As many 
different  factors  may come into  consideration,  holding a  State  responsible  for  a 
breach of the due diligence obligation based on constructive knowledge requires an 
adequately profound assessment of the evidence.  The IGE notes that  if  attackers 
used publicly known malware or exploited known vulnerabilities, the constructive 
knowledge  would  be  established  more  easily.135 The  same  applies  in  case  of 
involvement  of  State’s  governmental  infrastructure  in  the  harmful  operation.136 
Other scholars suggest that constructive knowledge is likely to be constructed when 
132 Tallin Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 6, para 39. 
133 Liu, supra note 130. pp.197, 232, 235 – 241.
134 The Netherlands: International law in cyberspace, supra note 108. p. 4.
135 Tallin Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 6, para 40.
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the cyber operation is traceable to a single State,137 “when the State intensively guards 
its cyber infrastructure, when the cyber operation involves a cyber activity that is generally 
always detected such as a Distributed Denial of Service attack that significantly increases 
bandwidth usage compared to normal usage, or when the State’s cyber infrastructure has 
already been exploited for the  purpose of  conducting a series  of  similar  offensive cyber 
operations.”138
Some  scholars  even  advocate  a  reverse  presumptio  juris  in  the  case  of  the 
involvement  of  the  governmental  infrastructure.139 According  to  their  view,  the 
States alleged of breaching the due diligence obligation would have to prove that 
they did not pose the presumed constructive knowledge. However, this view is not 
supported  by  the  ICJ  case-law.140 If  the  constructive  knowledge  concept  was 
employed in cyberspace, it should be applied rather restrictively.141 For instance, the 
mere indication of  involvement  of  State’s  governmental  infrastructure combined 
with high-intensity State control over it does not unequivocally imply that the State 
should  have  known  of  the  use  of  its  infrastructure.142 It  could  be  possible  that 
governmental  infrastructure  was  compromised  by  previously  unknown  malware 
and used to cause significant harm to other  State  without any knowledge of  the 
territorial State and the circumstances of the case would be such that it could not be 
reasonably expectable that the territorial State should have known of the malicious 
use of its infrastructure. Moreover, it should be remembered that different levels of 
technological  capabilities  different  States  possess  also  play  a  significant  role  in 
assessing what is reasonably expectable that a State should have been aware of in 
given circumstances.
137 Liu, supra note 130. p. 237.
138 Couzigou, supra note 130. p. 42.
139 Ibid., p. 43.
Liu, supra note 130. p. 237.
140 Corfu Channel, supra note 13. p. 18.
ROSCINI, Marco. Evidentiary Issues in International Disputes Related to State Responsibility for 
Cyber Operations. Texas International Law Journal, 2015, vol. 50, no. 2-3, pp. 245 – 248.
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In  the  Corfu  Channel case,  the ICJ  acknowledged that  even though the exclusive 
control of State over its territory can, by itself, neither establish responsibility nor 
shift the burden of proof, the harmed States might face evidentiary hurdle to gather 
direct proofs of facts giving rise to responsibility because of the exclusivity of the 
territorial  State’s  control.  Therefore,  the  harmed State  “should  be  allowed  a  more 
liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence”143 leaving no room for 
reasonable  doubt.144 Accordingly,  States  could  present  indirect  evidence,  for 
instance, in the case when a State’s infrastructure has been repeatedly used by a 
single  attacker (or  group of  attackers)  in operations with similar  modus  operandi 
against  a  certain  State  and  there  is  an  indication  that  it  will  be  used  for  such 
purposes again. If the attacker caused significant harm to the target State by using 
the territorial State’s cyber infrastructure employing the same modus operandi as it 
did on previous occasions, constructive knowledge of the territorial State could be 
established on the basis  of  evidence presented by the target  State  related to the 
repeatedly used  modus operandi demonstrating the connection between malicious 
cyber operations and the territorial State’s cyber infrastructure.
The application of constructive knowledge doubtlessly increases the standard of due 
diligence  in  cyberspace.  It  precludes  States  from  being  ignorant  to  what  is 
happening in their cyber infrastructures, and also from backing up hacker groups 
repeatedly  causing  significant  harm  to  other  States.  The  basic  criterion  for  the 
assessment  of  constructive  knowledge is  meeting reasonable  expectations in  the 
normal course of events. Logically, the question of what is reasonably expectable 
that States should normally do in order to meet the criterion arises. The IGE opposed 
the hypothesis that States should be obliged to take preventive measures for this 
purpose,  in  particular,  to  monitor  their  networks  or  take  similar  steps  alerting 
authorities of malicious use of cyber infrastructure. Instead, it concluded that “if the 




course of events would have discovered the use of the cyber infrastructure in question, it is  
appropriate  to  conclude  that  the  knowledge  criterion  is  satisfied.”145 Even though the 
vagueness of the IGE formulation is not fully satisfactory, it should be remembered 
that  due diligence is  a  flexible standard and presuming what States  should have 
known is somewhat dangerous. From this point of view, the vagueness of the IGE 
conclusion is justified.
4.1.3Violation of State’s rights
The  due  diligence  obligation  may  be  triggered  only  when  State’s  rights  are 
violated.146 This triggering element ensures that States do not bear an obligation to 
take measures to terminate operations that cause only minor disruptions or mere 
inconvenience  to  the  target  States.147 Consequently,  the  due  diligence  obligation 
relates  only  to  situations  when  a  certain  threshold  of  seriousness  was  reached. 
While  this  basic  premise  is  undisputable,  the  determination  of  the  threshold  of 
seriousness is not without controversies.
First of all, the question of which rights of States can be violated in cyberspace is a 
subject of a deep and dividing discussion between States. Specifically, the issue of 
whether  the  prohibition  of  violation  of  sovereignty  is  a  rule  on  its  own  causes 
troubles. United Kingdom argues that there is no specific rule prohibiting violation 
of territorial sovereignty, stating that it is not possible to “extrapolate from the general 
principle [of sovereignty] a specific rule or additional prohibition for cyber activity beyond 
that  of  a  prohibited  intervention.”148 Consequently,  sovereignty  cannot  be  a  value 
protected  by  the  due  diligence  principle  in  the  UK  view  and  the  violation  of 
sovereignty cannot constitute a violation of the due diligence obligation. As of early 
145 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 6, para 42. 
146 States’ rights might be violated also by operations targeting non-state actors if their right are 
violated. See Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 6, para. 36. 
147 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 6, para. 26.
148 United Kingdom Attorney General's Office. Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century 
[online]. 23 May 2018. Available from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-
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2020,  United  Kingdom  is  the  only  State  advocating  this  view.149 There  are  some 
indications that the United States may also adopt the same view.150 Nevertheless, the 
United States position is yet to be clarified. 
France  has  quite  the  opposite  opinion  on  sovereignty.  It  argues  that  “[a]ny 
cyberattack against French digital systems or any effects produced on French territory by 
digital means by a State organ, a person or an entity exercising elements of governmental 
authority or by a person or persons acting on the instructions of or under the direction or  
control  of  a  State  constitutes  a  breach  of  sovereignty.”151 This  is  the  broadest 
understanding of the breach of sovereignty possible. Therefore, the gravity of the 
breach  has  to  be  further  evaluated  case-by-case  and  after  the  evaluation  of  the 
gravity  of  the  cyber  operation,  the  State  decides  how  to  respond  to  the  breach 
appropriately. In the French view, from the principle of sovereignty does derive a 
right on its own. Similarly to France, the Netherlands “believes that respect for the 
sovereignty of other countries is an obligation in its own right, the violation of which may 
in  turn  constitute  an  internationally  wrongful  act.”152 Moreover,  the  Netherlands 
referred  to  the  ICJ  opinion  expressed  in  the  Nicaragua case  that  there  is  an 
“obligation under customary international law not to violate the sovereignty of another 
State.”153 Also Germany shares the same view.154 The authors of Tallinn Manual 2.0 
unanimously  agreed  on  the  same  opinion  that  the  Netherlands,  France  and 
149 ROGUSKI, Przemysław. Russian Cyber Attacks Against Georgia, Public Attributions and 
Sovereignty in Cyberspace. Just Security [online]. 6 March 2020. Available from 
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Germany have in  relation to  the prohibition of violation as  a standalone rule of 
international law.155
Whereas the United Kingdom advocates the opinion that there is no rule prohibiting 
violation of sovereignty, it recently condemned Russia for undermining Georgia’s 
sovereignty by attributing a large-scale disruptive cyber attack on Georgia that on 28 
October 2019 left some of governmental and national media services inoperable for 
some time156 to GRU – Russia’s military intelligence service. It further suggested that 
this Russian behavior is disrespectful of international law.157 That contradicts the 
UK’s  resistant  position related to  sovereignty as  a standalone rule  unless the UK 
would qualify it as prohibited intervention.
Roguski argued that the Georgian case revealed the weakness of the UK’s position of 
“sovereignty as principle only”.158 He stressed that if the Russian attacks on Georgia 
would not be qualified as a breach of the “sovereignty rule,” there would not be any  
other rule possibly qualified as violated, and Russia could not bear any responsibility 
under international law because the attack would fall below the threshold of use of 
force as well as prohibited intervention.159 That would make the attack lawful (unless 
the UK would actually qualify it as prohibited intervention). Moreover, Russia would 
not breach its due diligence obligation even if it knew that the attack was underway,  
who was the perpetrator,160 and still did not even try to take any measures to put an 
end to it.
155 Tallinn manual 2.0 , supra note 1. Rule 4.
156 Georgia hit by massive cyber-attack. BBC [online]. 28 October 2019. Available from 
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On  the  other  end  of  the  “sovereignty  as  a  rule”  discussion  is  the  French  view 
considering any cyber attack or any effects produced on French territory by digital 
means attributable to a State as a breach of sovereignty – a violation of State’s right. 
Accordingly,  any  cyber  attack  or  effects  by  digital  means  would  trigger  the  due 
diligence  obligation.  That  is  certainly  not  desirable.  If  the  French  view  of  the 
threshold of violation of sovereignty were applied, there would have to be another 
additional threshold for the determination of the attachment of the due diligence 
obligation. France did not introduce any additional threshold in this regard. Unlike 
the IGE and the Netherlands. See below.
Advocating the “sovereignty as a rule”, Germany did not address the threshold for 
violation of  sovereignty.  The  Netherlands noted that  due to  the alternations and 
uncertainties  the cyberspace brings  to the concepts of  territoriality  and physical 
tangibility  the “precise  boundaries  of  what  is  and is  not  permissible  have  yet  to  fully 
crystallise.”161 The authors of Tallinn Manual 2.0 offered some guiding criteria that 
could be use when determining the threshold of violation of sovereignty, but their  
views were divided when they assessed the criteria, so they ended up with the same 
unsatisfactory  result  like  the  Netherlands  noting  that  the  threshold  needs  to  be 
clarified by the State practice.162 The practice seems to be evolving already, triggered 
by the collective attribution of the above-mentioned 2019 cyber attack on Georgia. 
Besides  United  Kingdom,  the  United  States163 and  many  European  States164 also 
161 The Netherlands: International law in cyberspace, supra note 108. p. 2.
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condemned Russia  for  undermining Georgia’s  sovereignty.  Georgia,165 along with 
Czechia,166 even  expressively  referred  to  the  infringement,  resp.  violation  of 
sovereignty.
Additional threshold of serious adverse consequences
Another  way  how  to  determine  the  threshold  for  the  due  diligence  obligation 
application is to set an additional threshold for the due diligence obligation itself. 
That is the way the authors of Tallinn Manual 2.0 decided to take. They used an 
analogy from the international environmental law holding that  the due diligence 
obligation  applies  when  a  cyber  operation  (affects  other  States  rights  and 
furthermore) results in ‘serious adverse consequences’. The Netherlands took the 
same position.167 Unfortunately, the boundaries of the threshold of serious adverse 
consequences from the international environmental law is not transferable to the 
cyber context, and the experts could not further agree on the precise threshold for  
the identification of such consequences.168 Nonetheless, they managed to agree that 
neither  a  presence  of  physical  damage  to  objects  nor  injuries  to  individuals  is 
required169 and provided a series of examples that could be used for the refinement 
of the threshold.170
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4.2 Controversial aspects of the due diligence principle in the cyber 
context
In this section, I analyze some controversial aspects of the due diligence principle in 
the cyber context. The first two subsections introduce cyber-specific aspects that are 
especially troublesome due to their unique nature of the cyber environment that 
makes them impossible to analogy to any other situation. The last subsection studies 
reasonableness –  the fundamental  aspect  of  the application of the due diligence 
principle – in the light of the specific characteristics of cyberspace and the known 
positions of States in this respect.
4.2.1Transit States
The  character  of  cyberspace  enables  attackers  not  only  to  use  the  cyber 
infrastructure located on the territory where they found themselves but also to use 
other  infrastructures  located  all  around  the  world  remotely.  The  scale  of  such 
remote uses ranges from complete takeover of control over compromised devices to 
mere routing of data through cyber infrastructure. The mere transit of routed data 
represents the minimal possible use of State infrastructure and often passes through 
a  State  infrastructure  without  being  detected  by  the  territorial  State.171 The  IGE 
argues  that  if  the  transit  State  had  knowledge  (actual  or  constructive)  of  the 
operation  and could  take  measures  to  effectively  terminate  it,  the due diligence 
obligation  should  apply  and  the  territorial  State  should  act  accordingly.172 The 
applicability of the due diligence principle to the transit States is also endorsed by 
Australia.173
171 SHACKELFORD, Scott J., RUSSELL Scott and KUEHN Andreas. Unpacking the International Law 
on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public and Private Sectors. In Chicago Journal of 
International Law, vol. 17, no. 1, 2016. p. 21.
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173 See Chapter 3.3 of this thesis. 
47
Shackeford,  Russel  and  Kuehn  proposed  three  special  due  diligence  obligations 
deriving from the general due diligence principle that could be reasonably required 
from the transit States.174 The first one is the monitoring of State’s infrastructure and 
mitigating all cyber threats – a requirement the IGE categorically refuses to subsume 
under the general due diligence obligation in cyberspace.175 The second one is a duty 
to warn the target States of operations detected in their infrastructures and the last 
one is a duty to cooperate with the target State to identify the source of harmful 
operation. Unfortunately, the duty to warn would be hindered by the fact that the 
transit State would not probably know which State is the target State of the operation 
as there might be several more transit  States engaged before the malicious code 
reaches its target so the transit State could struggle with addressing the right State. 
Further, the duty to cooperate in order to identify the source of the operation would 
be deficient for the protection of other States’ rights if it was applied alone without 
any other measures. And finally, monitoring of State’s infrastructure is regarded as 
onerous and ineffective.176
Action ability of transit States is further complicated by the fact that most Internet 
traffic passes through cyber infrastructure that is owned and controlled by private 
Internet Service Providers. It is them who gets to the detection of malicious traffic. 
Effective application of the due diligence obligation requires cooperation of these 
private entities with States.  Therefore, States should to impose obligations on the 
Internet Service Providers to report to them the detected malicious activity with the 
potential  to  violate  other States’  rights.177 Subsequently,  once a State  manages  to 
detect  malicious  activity  routed  through  its  infrastructure,  it  should  act  in 
accordance with the due diligence obligation.
174 SHACKELFORD, Scott J., RUSSELL Scott and KUEHN Andreas. Unpacking the International Law 
on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public and Private Sectors. In Chicago Journal of 
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4.2.2Use of botnets
Botnet is “a network of compromised computers, so-called ‘bots’, remotely controlled by an 
intruder, ‘the botherder’, used to conduct coordinated cyber operations, such as distributed 
denial of service operations. There is no practical limit on the number of bots that can be  
assimilated into a botnet.”178 And there is also no territorial limitation of botnet. Once 
they are compromised, the bots controlled by the intruder cause harm unwittingly. 
They are often called “zombies” because they seem to function normally but, in fact,  
they distribute ransomware or participate in DDoS attacks. The botnet network can 
be composed of devices from all over the world. When a huge botnet is activated and 
causes violation to a State’s rights, the question arises of whether individual States 
where bots are located shoulder the due diligence obligation in the case that the use 
of  bots  in  any  single  State  does  not  alone  reach  the  threshold  of  seriousness 
triggering the due diligence obligation.179
Some experts  of  the  IGE suggested  that  if  an  operation  using  botnet  reach that 
threshold  in  total,  each  State  where  bots  were  located  should  shoulder  the  due 
diligence obligation on the basis of aggregation of operations from all  the States 
involved in botnet. The majority of the IGE, however, concluded that aggregating 
operations “would create an imbalance between the right to control territory and the duty 
to ensure it is not used to harm other States”180 and if the aggregation approach was 
adopted  “States  could  be  held  responsible  for  an  internationally  wrongful  act  based 
primarily upon the omissions of other States (i.e., those of the other States from which the 
botnet is operated).”181 
Indeed, States should not be expected to do more that is reasonable to expect from 
them  taking  into  account  particularly  the  exercise  of  sovereignty  over  their 
respective territories. Yet, the question of effectiveness of fulfilling the due diligence 
178 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Glossary. p. 563.
179 Ibid., Rule 6, para 29.
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obligation also has its role in relation to the botnet networks. For instance, in the 
2007  cyber  attacks  on  Estonia,  bots  from  178  States  were  used.  If  all  178  States 
neutralized the zombies located on their territory, would it effectively terminate or, 
at least, significantly reduced harm suffered by Estonia? If so, should it be more 
reasonable to expect them to do so?
4.2.3Reasonably expected State behavior in cyberspace
Due diligence is a standard of conduct. The conduct that is required under the due 
diligence principle is a reasonably expected conduct aimed at the protection of other 
States’  rights.  ‘Reasonableness’  is  the  cornerstone  of  the  application  of  the  due 
diligence principle. It ensures that it cannot be required from States to use measures 
they do not possess, and it further determines which measures are expected to be 
taken  in  particular  situations  and  which  not.  The  determination  is  based  on 
balancing the impact of the measures on a territorial State that would take them and 
the gravity of the harm potentially sustained by target States. More specifically, it 
cannot  be  required  from  a  sovereign  State  to  take  measures  that  would  cause 
significant harm to itself.
In the view of the IGE, such situation could occur, for instance, if a State did not 
have any other measure to take than to shut down some of its essential networks in 
order to terminate an operation harmful to a target State. The Netherlands shared its 
view on the matter of reasonableness stating that “[i]f, for example, a cyberattack is 
carried out against  the  Netherlands  using servers  in  another  country,  the  Netherlands 
may, on the basis of the due diligence principle, ask the other country to shut down the 
servers.”182 The reasonably expected diligent behavior of the territorial State notified 
by the Netherlands would consist of shutting down the indicated servers. At first 
sight,  the  view  of  the  Netherlands  may  seem  contradictory  to  that  of  the  IGE. 
However, this conclusion would be rather hasty. While the IGE refers to “essential 
182 The Netherlands: International law in cyberspace, supra note 108. p. 4.
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networks”, the Netherlands uses more general expression “servers”. The difference 
between these two categories may be crucial. This demonstrates that the assessment 
of reasonableness is dependent on the detailed factual circumstances of each case. 
In  relation  to  the  reasonable  expectations,  Australia  noted  that  “it  may  not  be 
reasonable  to  expect  (or  even  possible  for)  a  state  to  prevent  all  malicious  use  of  ICT 
infrastructure located within its territory.” This view is generally accepted. If it were 
not,  the due diligence standard would shift from the standard of  conduct  to the 
standard of result, which would be indeed unreasonable.183 The debate related to the 
reasonableness is concerning also preventive monitoring of networks composing a 
State’s cyber infrastructure. Most scholars deem such monitoring unreasonable to 
expect.
Whether  the  application  of  the  due  diligence  principle  will  gain  momentum  in 
international cyber law largely depends on the adequacy of the refinement of what 
is reasonable to expect from States and what is not. If States were required to take 
unreasonably  burdensome  measures,  they  would  constantly  breach  their  due 
diligence obligations which could lead to an excessive use of countermeasures in 
response, loss of mutual confidence between States in dealing with the cyber issues 
and thus undermine international stability.184 Therefore, it is of crucial importance 
to refine the due diligence principle in a thorough manner adequately reflecting 
reasonable expectations. 
4.3 The content and the breach of the due diligence obligation
When the due diligence obligation is triggered,  the territorial  State must  take all 
feasible measures to put an end to the operation in concern. If it failed to do so, the 
breach of the due diligence obligation would be constituted. It  is  thus of crucial 
183 See Chapter 1.1 of the present thesis.
184 JENSEN, Eric T., WATTS Sean. A Cyber Duty of Due Diligence: Gentle Civilizer or Crude 
Destabilizer?. Texas Law Review, vol. 95, 2017. p. 1574.
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importance to bear in mind that after the activation of the due diligence obligation 
by the triggering elements, the obligation might be violated only by the subsequent 
omission  of  taking  required  measures  by  the  territorial  State.  Accordingly,  the 
omission  of  taking  measures  would  not  arise  if  there  were  not  any  available 
measures  for  the territorial  State  to  put  an end to  the operation.  Therefore,  the 
feasibility of measures is a crucial aspect for the determination of the breach.
As  already  noted,  due  diligence  is  a  flexible  standard  based  on  reasonable 
expectations States  should meet.  The  behavior  required under  the due diligence 
principle differs according to the given circumstances.  The factor that varies the 
level of required care to a great extent is the feasibility of measures a State can take.  
‘Feasibility’ indicates the availability of reasonably expectable measures to a State in 
a  particular  situation.  The  due  diligence  principle  cannot  oblige  States  to  take 
measures they are simply not able to take. Neither can it require taking measures 
that  are  not  reasonably  expectable  from them.  This  aspect  of  the  due  diligence 
principle is particularly influential in cyberspace because of significant differences 
in the technological development of States.
The more technologically developed a State is, the more probably it will be able to 
take appropriate due diligence measures.185 Accordingly, reasonable expectations, 
as well as due diligence standard required from the technologically advanced States, 
will  rise.  Besides,  cyber  infrastructure  of  such States  is  an  enticing  medium for 
conducting operations of malicious non-state actors, especially through botnets.186 
Therefore,  technologically  advanced  States  will  be  those  who  bear  the  heaviest 
burden of the due diligence obligation. 
The feasibility of measures largely depends on States’  cyber capabilities.  When a 
State  has  more  measures  available  to  it  that  would  satisfy  the  due  diligence 
obligation, it can employ any measures it deems appropriate as long as it complies 
185 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 7, para 16.
186 SCHMITT. In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, supra note 45. p. 74.
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with the due diligence obligation. Possession of some capabilities, such as blocking 
IP addresses located in the State territory, is widespread among States and it can be 
presumed that most of States are capable of taking measures like blocking certain IP 
addresses  engaged  in  a  malicious  operation.187 On  the  other  hand,  States  may 
possess  some  particular  cyber  capabilities  they  do  not  want  to  disclose. 
Undoubtedly, due to the legitimate security interests,  it  cannot be required from 
States to expose all their cyber capabilities. Therefore, in some situations, States can 
declare themselves incapable of taking appropriate measures even though they have 
specific  capabilities  that  enable  them  to  put  an  end  to  malicious  operations. 
Correspondingly, the protection of legitimate security interests precluding the use 
of secrete cyber capabilities in order to comply with the due diligence obligation is 
an inherent limitation of the application of the due diligence.
There might be situations when the territorial State lacks measures to put an end to 
the operation and other State or a group of States do have adequate capabilities to  
terminate the operation and are willing to assist the territorial State. This situation 
raises the question of whether the territorial State is obliged to request assistance 
from the States possessing adequate capabilities. The IGE rejected that the territorial 
States should bear additional obligation to request external assistance building upon 
the limitation of the due diligence obligation by the capacities of the sovereignty of 
the territorial State.   
Interestingly, the IGE suggests that if a State lacked adequate capability itself, hiring 
an external private company having the adequate capabilities to perform the task 
under the territorial State’s control could be an appropriate step to comply with the 
requirement of exhausting all feasible measures.188 However, the use of this method 
would  have  to  be  reasonably  justified  by  the  elevated  harm  of  the  target  State. 
Additionally, there are private companies that own, operate and control large parts 
187 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 7, para 16.
188 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 7, para 17. 
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of  States’  cyber  infrastructure,  such  as  Internet  Service  Providers  or  Mobile 
Operators, whose abilities in relation to the confrontation of malicious uses of such 
parts  of  infrastructure  are  fundamental  for  compliance  with  the  due  diligence 
obligation. In the view of the IGE, States must “exhaust all feasible means to secure the 
cooperation” with these companies to comply with the due diligence obligation.189
189 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 7, paras. 19–20.
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5 Responses to the breach of the due diligence obligation
The violation of  the  due diligence obligation gives  rise  to  the constitution of  an 
internationally wrongful act under the law of State responsibility. As a consequence, 
the injured States are entitled to resort to lawful responses under international law 
against  the  State  that  breached  its  due  diligence  obligation.  These  self-help 
responses  include  acts  of  retorsion  and  countermeasures.  It  is  noteworthy  that 
France  probably  misread190 Tallinn  Manual  2.0  and  thinking  that  the  Manual 
advocated use of self-defense as a lawful response to the breach of the due diligence 
obligation, it expressively opposed such possibility. I comment on the background 
of this misunderstanding in the last section of this chapter. 
5.1 Retorsion
Whereas countermeasures are measures that would be otherwise unlawful if they 
were  not  taken  in  response  to  the  breach  of  an  internationally  wrongful  act,191 
retorsion  is  conduct  that  is  lawful  but  “unfriendly”.  Even  though  they  are 
“unfriendly” in nature and may be detrimental to the interests of the States targeted 
by them, the acts of retorsion do not violate any international obligations.192
Typical  measures  of  retorsion  are  limitations  on  diplomatic  relations,  such  as 
declaring diplomats on a mission in foreign States persona non grata or embargos.193 
In relation to the malicious cyber activities, the United States prohibits the entry of 
persons involved in such activities into the United States territory.194 With a notable 
190 SCHMITT, Michael N. France’s Major Statement on International Law and Cyber: An Assessment. 
Just Security [online], 16 September 2019. Available from https://www.justsecurity.org/66194/frances-
major-statement-on-international-law-and-cyber-an-assessment/. 
191 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 36. Commentary on countermeasures, para 
1.
192 Ibid., Commentary on countermeasures, para 3.
193 Ibid. 
194 Executive Order "Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious 
Cyber-Enabled Activities". The White House [online]. 1 April 2015. Available from 
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restriction of impediments to the authorized transit to or from the United Nations 
headquarters,195 there is no international law obligation granting the free entry of 
foreign  citizens  into  the  territory  of  United  States.  Therefore,  if  not  used  for 
impediments to the transit to or from the UN headquarters,196 this measure is also an 
example of a measure of retorsion.197 Additionally, retorsion could be conducted via 
cyber  means,  for  instance,  by  blocking  certain  communication  transmission 
emanating from another State.198 The Netherlands suggest  that  a  cyber  retorsion 
measures could be also “limiting or cutting off the other state’s access to servers or other 
digital infrastructure in its territory, provided the countries in question have not concluded 
a treaty on mutual access to digital infrastructure in each other’s territory.”199
Acts of retorsion are not subject to any procedural requirements under international 
law.200 They are within the full discretion of States that undertake them as long as 
they are limited to acts that do not violate international obligations. That means that, 
inter  alia,  that  there  is  no  requirement  of  previous  notification  of  measures  of 
retorsion,  nor  limitation  of  duration  of  the  measures.  Moreover,  the  lack  of 
procedural  pre-conditions  enables  States  to  undertake  retorsion  “regardless  of 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/01/executive-order-blocking-
property-certain-persons-engaging-significant-m.
195 Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the 
Headquarters of the United Nations. United Nations – Treaty Series no. 147. 26 June 1947.
196 See a recent example of such prohibited restriction here: LYNCH, Colum, GRAMER, Robbie. 
Trump Administration Blocks Iran’s Top Diplomat From Addressing the U.N. Security Council. 
Foreign Policy [online]. 6 January 6 2020. Available from https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/trump-
administration-blocks-iran-foreign-minister-zarif-addressing-un-security-council/. 
197 TZANAKOPOULOS, Antonios. State Responsibility for Targeted Sanctions. AJIL Unbound, 113, 
2019, p. 136.
Recently, the Council of the European Union adopted legislation that enables it to take measures to 
respond to cyber attacks, including attempted cyber attacks, on the Member States and the EU 
institutions. The legislation includes a measure of prevention of the entry of the sanctioned 
individuals into, or transit through, territories of the EU Member States.
198 SCHMITT, Michael N. Below the Threshold Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response 
Option and International Law. Virginia Journal of International Law, 2014, vol. 54, no. 3. p. 701.
199 The Netherlands: International law in cyberspace, supra note 108. p. 7.
200 DUPONT, Pierre-Emmanuel. Countermeasures and Collective Security: The Case of the EU 
Sanctions Against Iran. Journal of Conflict & Security Law, 2012, vol. 17. no. 3, pp. 301–336.
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whether the targeted state's unwanted behavior violated international law or not.”201 In 
other words,  “anybody is  allowed to  be  unfriendly as  long as  they  do not violate  the 
law.”202
5.2 Countermeasures
By contrast, there are many conditions to the lawful use of countermeasures. This is 
so  particularly  because,  as  noted  by  the  ILC,  “[l]ike  other  forms  of  self-help, 
countermeasures  are  liable  to  abuse and  this  potential  is  exacerbated  by  the  factual 
inequalities  between  States.”203 Some scholars  see  the restrictions  in  application of 
countermeasures  so  limiting  in  the  cyber  context  that  they  allege  that  the 
restrictions could, in fact, encourage, States to interpret the hostile cyber operations 
as  uses  of  force  or  armed attacks  in  order  to  broader  their  options  of  self-help 
remedies with a view to possibly resort to self-defense which would is difficult to 
employ than countermeasures.204 Because of these restrictions that render the resort 
to  countermeasures  in  the  cyber  realm  ineffective,  scholars,  as  well  as  States, 
proposed some modifications of the application of countermeasures, which would 
make them more available and more effective.
5.2.1Purpose and character of countermeasures
Countermeasures may be employed in order to induce a State which is responsible 
for an internationally wrongful act to comply with its international obligations,205 for 
instance, the due diligence obligation. Therefore, the purpose of countermeasures 
201 TIKK, Eneken. Will Cyber Consequences Deepen Disagreement on International Law. Temple 
International & Comparative Law Journal, 2018, vol. 32, no. 2. p. 193.
202 TZANAKOPOULOS, Antonios. State Responsibility for Targeted Sanctions. AJIL Unbound, 113, 
2019, p. 136.
203 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 36. Commentary on countermeasures, para 
2.
204 CORN, Gary, JENSEN, Eric. The use of force and cyber countermeasures. Temple International & 
Comparative Law Journal, 2018, vol. 32, no. 2. p. 129.
However, self-defense is not an instrument State might use in response to a breach of the due 
diligence obligation. 
205 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 36. Article 49, para. 1.
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must not be the punishment of the State that breached the due diligence obligation. 
In  addition,  anticipatory  countermeasures  are  not  permitted,206 nor 
countermeasures  that  aim  to  deter.207 Further,  the  countermeasures  are  of  a 
temporary  character.208 They  must  be  terminated  as  soon  as  the  legality  of  the 
relation between the concerned States is restored.209 In this regard, it is important to 
note that if the responsible State is obligated to provide reparations to the injured 
State,  the  countermeasures  may  continue  even  though  the  malicious  operation 
giving rise to the breach of the due diligence has ended.210 In fact, countermeasures 
may also be employed after the termination of the operation to ensure reparation 
only,211 but  once  the  dispute  in  concern  gets  before  a  judicial  organ,  the 
countermeasures  must  be  suspended  without  due  delay.212 The  character  of 
temporality  implies  that  the  countermeasures  should  be  reversible.213 However, 
Schmitt notes that the requirement of reversibility is not absolute, demonstrating it 
with an example of a DoS214 countermeasure which “can be  terminated and service 
restored, but the activities that were blocked may not be able to be performed later.”215
5.2.2Limitation of countermeasures
An essential limitation of countermeasures is that they shall not amount to the level 
of  use  of  force,  nor  affect  other  fundamental  obligations  of  international  law.216 
206 Although some scholars oppose this view. Cf. CORN, Gary, JENSEN, Eric. The use of force and 
cyber countermeasures. Temple International & Comparative Law Journal, 2018, vol. 32, no. 2. p. 131.
207 SCHMITT. Below the Threshold Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and 
International Law, supra note 198. p. 715.
208 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 36. Commentary to the Article 49, para. 7.
209 Ibid.
210 SCHMITT. Below the Threshold Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and 
International Law, supra note 198. p. 715.
211 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 36. Commentary to the Article 49, para. 8.
212 Ibid., Article 52, para. 3.
213 Ibid., Commentary to the Article 49, para. 9.
214 “Denial of Service (DoS): The non-availability of computer system resources to
their users. A denial of service can result from a cyber operation.” in Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. 
Glossary. p. 564.
215 SCHMITT. Below the Threshold Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and 
International Law, supra note 198. p. 714.
216 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 36. Article 50.
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Besides,  the  countermeasures  must  be  proportional.  217  The  requirement  of 
proportionality does not reflect only the seriousness of injury suffered, but also the 
rights of the injured State that were violated and the gravity of the breach of the 
international  obligation.218 Therefore,  when  an  injured  State  undertakes 
countermeasures on the basis of the breach of the due diligence obligation, it must 
take into consideration that the responsible State did not violate the injured State’s  
sovereignty, nor breached the prohibition of intervention or prohibition of use of 
force,219 even though the severity of the operation corresponded to a violation of 
such rights. Breaching its due diligence obligation, the responsible State failed to 
take measures to protect such rights, it did not violate them. This factor must be 
taken into account by the injured State. The ILC notes that “the position of other States 
which  may  be  affected  may  also  be  taken  into  consideration.”220 This  might  be  an 
interesting implication for the application of countermeasures in the cyber context 
overall,  because cyber  operations,  particularly  those using botnets,  may target  a 
practically unlimited number of States.221
5.2.3Procedural pre-conditions to the use of countermeasures
As concerns procedural pre-conditions to the lawful use of countermeasures, Article 
52  paragraph  1  of  the  ILC  Draft  Articles  on  State  Responsibility sets  two 
requirements  of  prior  notifications.  First,  the  injured  State  must  call  on  the 
responsible State to comply with its obligations (Article 52 paragraph 1 letter a) and 
second, the injured State must notify the responsible State of any decision to take 
217 Ibid., Article 51.
218 Ibid.
219 SCHMITT. Below the Threshold Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and 
International Law, supra note 198. p. 709.
220 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 36. Commentary to the Article 51, para. 6.
221 An example of such operation is notoriously known WannaCry ransomware campaign that 
affected around 150 States worldwide (see COOPER, Charles. WannaCry: Lessons Learned 1 Year 




countermeasures and offer negotiations on the issue (Article 52 paragraph 1 letter 
b).222 The ILC notes that the two notifications can be made simultaneously.223 As a 
practical  matter  of  the  application  of  the  due  diligence  principle,  these  two 
notifications  could  be  combined  with  the  notification  of  the  State  targeted  by 
malicious operation to the territorial State. Accordingly, the notification procedure 
would look as follows: the target State notifies the territorial State that there is an on-
going cyber operation targeting the target State that emanates from the territory of 
the  territorial  State.224 At  the  same  time,  the  target  State  would  call  upon  the 
territorial State to fulfill its due diligence obligation and notify it that if it failed to do 
so, it might undertake countermeasures against the territorial State.
Nevertheless,  sometimes the notification of the intention to take countermeasures 
may render the effectiveness of countermeasures thwarted.225 This may occur, for 
instance, with asset freezing. After the notification of intention to freeze assets by 
the injured State, the responsible State might withdraw assets  from banks in the 
injured State, which would make the asset freezing infeasible.226 Therefore, Article 
52  paragraph  2  of  the  ILC  Draft  Articles  on  State  Responsibility  introduces  an 
exception  to  the  requirement  of  the  notification  of  intention  to  take 
countermeasures  and  offering  of  negotiations  represented  by “urgent 
countermeasures”. This exception, however, does not relate to the requirement of 
call  upon  the  responsible  State  to  comply  with  its  obligations  under  Article  52 
paragraph 1 letter a.
An  evolving  opinio  iuris  of  States  concerning  the  use  of  countermeasures  as  a 
response  to  hostile  cyber  operation  moves  towards  the  view  that  urgent 
countermeasures  may  be  especially  important  because  the  notification  pre-
222 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 36. Article 52, para. 1.
223 Ibid., Commentary to the Article 52, para. 5.
224 After such notification, the territorial State would gain knowledge of the operation in concern 
which is one the elements triggering the due diligence obligation.
225 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 36. Commentary to the Article 52, para. 6.
226 Ibid., Commentary to the Article 52, para. 6.
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conditions are not well adaptable to the cyber context. France emphasized that “[t]he 
possibility of taking urgent counter-measures is particularly relevant in cyberspace, given 
the  widespread use  of  concealment  procedures  and the  difficulties  of  traceability.”  The 
United Kingdom noted that “where the UK is responding to covert cyber intrusion with 
countermeasures,” it is not always obliged to give the prior notification because “it 
could  not  be  right  for  international  law to  require  a  countermeasure  to  expose  highly 
sensitive capabilities in defending the country.” The UK’s view is not entirely clear in 
what notifications the UK reserves to omit, but it seems that the UK goes beyond the 
concept of urgent countermeasures and suggests the possibility to derogate also the 
call upon the responsible State to fulfill its international obligations.
5.2.4 Collective countermeasures
Generally, an entity that may resort to countermeasures is the injured State.227 It also 
seems to be clear that where is a plurality of injured States, they are entitled each 
individually, but may take collaborative countermeasures by a joint effort.228 Apart 
from  this,  there  is  a  controversy  on  whether  non-injured  States  may  undertake 
countermeasures in the general or collective interest acting at the request and on 
behalf  of  the  injured  States.  In  2001,  the  ILC  acknowledged  that  there  is  State 
practice substantiating the use of such measures, but it considered it embryonic and 
insufficient for the determination of a rule regulating collective countermeasures.229 
Consequently, the ILC Draft Articles remain unclear on the issue leaving it for the 
further development of international law.230
In  2019,  Estonia  became the  first  State  who expressed its  view on the collective 
countermeasures in cyberspace. Bearing in mind massive cyber attacks targeting 
227 Non-state actors cannot resort to countermeasures. Potential defensive action of a non-state actor 
could give rise to the due diligence of a State where the non-state actor is based. See Tallinn Manual 
2.0, supra note 1. Rule 24, para. 2. 
228 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 24, para 10.
229 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 36. Commentary to Article 54, para. 6.
230 Ibid.
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the  whole  country  for  several  weeks  in  2007,231 Estonia,  unsurprisingly,  took  an 
affirmative position to the use of collective countermeasures advocating that “states 
which are not directly injured may apply countermeasures to support  the state directly 
affected  by  the  malicious  cyber  operation,”232 noting  that  “allies  matter  also  in 
cyberspace.”233 Estonia,  thus,  put  the “collective interest”  into the spotlight,  rather 
than “general interests”. More surprisingly, France, an ally of Estonia in NATO and 
the EU, opposed the Estonian position noting that collective countermeasures are 
not  permissible,  which  “rules  out  the  possibility  of  France  taking  such  measures  in 
response to an infringement of another State’s rights.”234 It is likewise noteworthy that 
the  issue  of  collective  countermeasures  resulted  too  controversial  to  reach 
consensus of the IGE on the issue of their lawfulness.235 At last, the majority argued 
that  taking  countermeasures  on  behalf  of  another  State  should  not  be  lawful.236 
Additionally,  the  IGE  examined  the  question  of  whether  States  may  provide 
assistance  to  the  injured  State  in  conducting  its  countermeasures.  This  matter, 
however, was left unresolved with three different views among the Experts.237
5.2.5Non-state actors targeted by countermeasures
Regardless of the lawfulness of collective countermeasures, it should remain clear 
that subjects entitled to resort to countermeasures are only States. Therefore, non-
state  actors  may not  undertake  countermeasures.238 That  being  indisputable,  the 
231 Estonia hit by 'Moscow cyber war'. BBC [online]. 17 May 2007. Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665145.stm. 
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238 Nevertheless, it may happen that a non-state actor targeted by a cyber attack urges the State A 
where it is based to undertake countermeasures but the State A decides not to undertake them. 
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State B where the attacker is based. Being unlawfully targeted by the non-state actor, the State B 
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question  is  whether  non-state  actors  could  be  targeted  by  countermeasures. 
Interestingly,  Schmitt  suggests  that  they could be.239 He argues that  “even though 
international law does not permit countermeasures against non-State actors on the basis of  
their  own  actions,  operations  against  the  non-State  groups  or  individuals  may  be 
appropriate if  styled as countermeasures  against  the  States  from which they act.”240 In 
other words, the real targeted subject of the defensive operation would be a non-
state actor, but for the violation of the sovereignty of the State’s where the non-state 
actor was based, the operation would qualify as countermeasures and thus would be 
permissible.  This  peculiar  use  of  countermeasures,  would,  however,  have  to  be 
consistent with other requirements necessary for lawful resort to countermeasures. 
Particularly,  fulfilling  the  purpose  of  countermeasures  –  to  induce  the  State 
responsible for  the breach of its  due diligence –  might be questionable in these 
cases.
5.3 Self-defense
Resorts to self-defense were traditionally related to reactions to the armed attacks 
conducted by States.  Nevertheless,  there is  an extensive practice of  use of force 
against non-state actors.241 Some of these actions were conducted with the consent of 
the States where the non-state actors were located or with the authorization of the 
United Nations Security Council. Such actions seem justified enough. Nevertheless, 
similar  actions  were  also  conducted  without  the  consent  of  the  territorial  State. 
could undertake countermeasures against State A if it failed to exercise its due diligence obligation in 
relation to the hack-back of the non-state actor. But if the State A did not fail its due diligence 
obligation, State B could not lawfully resort to countermeasures against State A. Nevertheless, it 
could resort to acts of retorsion, or act in necessity. See Tallinn Manual 2.0 , supra note 1. Rule 6, 
para. 34.
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Recently,  such actions were conducted on the basis  of  the  “unable  or  unwilling 
test”.242 Rather than generally accepted justification for uses of force against non-
state actors, this test represents still a controversial justification for actions on the 
territories of  sovereign States that  do not  agree with such uses of force on their  
territories. However, a growing number of States support the “unable or unwilling” 
doctrine,243 and so does the majority of the IGE in relation to the most severe cyber 
operations.
The majority of the IGE concluded that there are situations when States may resort 
to self-defense even if the operation amounting to the level of armed attack cannot 
be attributed to a territorial State and the territorial State did not give its consent to 
the defensive action.244 In the view of these Experts, the circumstances justifying the 
non-consensual  resort  to  self-defense  are  such  that  the  action  in  self-defense 
“complies with the principle of necessity, is the only effective means of defence against the  
armed attack, and the territorial State is unable (e.g.,  because it  lacks the expertise  or 
technology) or unwilling to take effective actions to repress the relevant elements of the 
cyber armed attack.  In particular, these Experts emphasized that States have a duty to 
ensure their territory is not used for acts contrary to international law.”245 The reference 
to the due diligence principle is somewhat confusing because the use of force under 
the “unable or unwilling doctrine” could be permissible not only on the territory of 
unwilling States (i.e. State in breach of the due diligence obligation) but also on the 
territory of unable States who actually comply with the due diligence obligation. The 
breach of the due diligence is therefore not a decisive element in the assessment of  
the unable or unwilling test.  More importantly,  the unable or unwilling doctrine 
242 OHLIN, Jens D. The Unwilling or Unable Doctrine Comes to Life. Opinio Juris [online], 23 
September 2014. Available from https://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/23/unwilling-unable-doctrine-comes-
life/. 
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does not permit the use of force against the territorial State, but only against the 
non-state actor located on the territory of the territorial State.
It  is  noteworthy  that  France  probably  misread246 Tallinn  Manual  2.0  and  got 
confused by the reference to the due diligence principle. Thinking that the Manual 
permits use of force against unable or unwilling States, it held that
[t]he fact that a State does not take all reasonable measures to stop wrongful acts  
against  other  States  perpetrated  from  its  territory  by  non-state  actors,  or  is 
incapable of preventing them, cannot constitute an exception to the prohibition 
of  the  use  of  force.  Under  these  conditions,  France  does  not  recognise  the 
extensive  approach  to  self-defence  expressed  by  a  majority  of  the  Tallinn 
Manual  Group of  Experts  which allows a State that  is  victim of  a  large-scale 
cyberattack perpetrated by non-state actors from the territory of another State to 
use self-defence against that State… A State’s failure to comply with this [due 
diligence] obligation is not a ground for an exception to the prohibition of the 
use of force.247
Nevertheless, the IGE did not advocate that the breach of the due diligence could 
justify the resort to self-defense against the territorial State.248 The target of the self-
defensive action would be a non-state actor, not the State on whose territory the 
actor was based. French interpretation of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 would mean that 
States  could  overcome the  attribution  problem solely  by  applying  the unable  or 
unwilling test. That would have a heavily destabilizing effect. As the Netherlands 
suggested, an action of self-defense could not be conducted without “adequate proof 
of the origin or source of the attack and without convincing proof that a particular state or 
states or organised group is responsible for conducting or controlling the attack. States may 
246 SCHMITT, Michael N. France’s Major Statement on International Law and Cyber: An Assessment. 
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therefore use force in self-defence only if the origin of the attack and the identity of those 
responsible are sufficiently certain. This applies to both state and non-state actors.”249
To conclude, in the view of the majority of  the IGE, the lack of diligence of the 
territorial State, i.e. its unwillingness to put an end to an operation of a non-state  
actor based on its territory amounting the level of the armed attack, could justify the 
use of force against non-state actor. Nevertheless, such lack of diligence should not 
justify the use of force against the unwilling territorial State. Therefore, self-defense 
is  not  a  lawful  response to the breach of  the due diligence obligation.  The  only 
permissible reactions to the breach are acts in retorsion and countermeasures taken 
in compliance with the requirements of the law of State responsibility.
249 The Netherlands: International law in cyberspace, supra note 108. p. 9.
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6 Preventive feature of due diligence
In the context of the due diligence principle, it is often discussed whether or not the 
principle  should  encompass  any  preventive  obligations.  This  is  so  particularly 
because,  in  international  environmental  law,  the  due  diligence  principle  has  a 
relevant preventive feature lying in the principle of prevention. The IGE, like most 
of  the  other  scholars,  firmly  rejects  the  opinion  that  preventive  due  diligence 
obligations  should exist  in  cyberspace.250 Its  rejective  opinion  is  build  upon two 
arguments. First, the requirement to prevent all possible cyber threats would put an 
onerous  burden  on  States,251 and  second,  the  requirement  to  prevent  future 
operations  would  contradict  the  knowledge  requirement.252 These  are,  for  sure, 
sound  arguments.  Nevertheless,  they  do  not  reflect  the  relevancy  of  the  due 
diligence principle known from international environmental law. Therefore, in the 
first section of this chapter, I analyze the potential transferability of the obligation of 
prevention to the cyber context.
In the second section, I emphasize the role of some private entities for the adequate 
functioning of the due diligence principle. Because those obligated by the principle 
of due diligence are States, I comment on how States should treat the mentioned 
entities  so  that  they  adequately  comply  with  their  due  diligence  obligations.  In 
addition,  I  assess  whether  the  private  entities  should  bear  any  portion  of 
responsibility related to due diligence or not. 
250 For an opposing opinion see e.g. STOCKBURGER, Peter Z. From Grey Zone to Customary 
International Law: How Adopting the Precautionary Principle May Help Crystallize the Due Diligence 
Principle in Cyberspace. 10th International Conference on Cyber Conflict CyCon X: Maximising Effects. 
NATO CCD COE Publications, 2018. ISBN 978-9949-9904-3-6.
251 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 7, para 8.
252 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 7, para 9.
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6.1 Analogy of environmental principle of prevention
The use of  preventive  due diligence measures  proved particularly  convenient  in 
international  environmental  law. Like malicious cyber  operations,  industrial  and 
similar  activities  may have a  negative  transboundary  impact.  The  risks  of  harm 
caused by such activities to neighboring States can be significant, and so can be the 
harm sustained. Because of the severity of potential harm to the environment of 
neighboring States and the abilities of States to control the hazardous activities, the 
due  diligence  principle  is  widely  applied  in  the  preventive  context  in  the 
international  environmental  law.  But  is  the  application  experience  from  the 
international  environmental  law  transferable  to  the  cyber  context?  Would  it  be 
reasonable to expect that States apply the due diligence principle to protect other 
States’ rights from malicious cyber activities in a similar manner as they apply it in 
international environmental law?
In  the  fundamental  case  of  international  environmental  law,  Trail  Smelter,253 a 
Canadian  smelting  company  based  in  Trail,  the  Dominion  of  Canada,  near  the 
border with the United States, greatly increased the intensity of smelting of zinc and 
lead ores which resulted in significant pollution of the environment of the United 
States.254 In  response,  the  American  government  claimed  damages  against  the 
Dominion  of  Canada.  The  Arbitral  Tribunal  resolving  the  dispute  laid  the 
foundations for the application of due diligence in international environmental law 
by holding that “no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or 
persons therein, when the case is of serious  consequence and the injury is established by 
clear and convincing evidence.”255
253 Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision (United States of America v. Canada). 16 April 1938 and 11 
March 1941. International Arbitral Awards. Vol 3. pp. 1905 – 1982.
254 Ibid., p. 1917.
255 Ibid., p. 1965.
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The importance of the preventive feature of due diligence was emphasized in the 
2010  Pulp  Mills judgment.256 In  this  judgment,  the  ICJ  identified the  principle  of 
prevention related to environmental due diligence as a customary rule and “part of 
the corpus of international law relating to the environment” resting on the obligation of 
a State “to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in  
its  territory,  or  in  any  area  under  its  jurisdiction,  causing  significant  damage  to  the 
environment  of  another  State.”257 In  this  context,  the  Court  underlined  a  wide 
acceptance among States which has gained an environmental impact assessment as 
a tool of preventive due diligence stating that “it may now be considered a requirement 
under general international law to undertake an environmental impact assessment where 
there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact 
in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource.”258
Five years later, the ICJ reaffirmed the conclusions from Pulp Mills in the Costa Rica 
judgment259 and  broadened  the  scope  of  the  activities  requiring  execution  of 
environmental impact assessment (hereinafter “EIA”) from the industrial activities 
to  any activities  that  may have a  significant  adverse transboundary impact.260 In 
addition, the Court held that “if the environmental impact assessment confirms that there 
is a risk of significant transboundary harm, a State planning an activity that carries such a 
risk  is  required,  in  order  to  fulfil  its  obligation to  exercise  due diligence  in  preventing  
significant transboundary harm, to notify, and consult with, the potentially affected State  
in good faith, where that is necessary to determine the appropriate measures to prevent or 
mitigate that risk.”261
256 Pulp Mills, supra note 53. pp. 14 – 107.
257 Ibid., para. 205.
258 Ibid., para. 204.
259 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and 
Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2015, pp. 665–742.
260 Ibid., para 104.
261 Ibid., para 168.
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The  international  environmental  law  incites  to  establish  two  preventive  due 
diligence obligations in cyberspace. The first one is a substantial obligation inspired 
by  the  principle  of  prevention262 requiring  States  to  use  all  the  means  at  their 
disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in the territory, or in any area 
under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to other States’ rights. The second 
one is a procedural obligation to undertake assessments of cyber activities where 
there is a risk of a significant transboundary impact, and, if the risk were identified, 
to notify and consult with the potentially harmed State the activity. The assessments 
should  be  conducted  prior  to  the  materialization  of  proposed  cyber  activities. 
Consequently, if a negative transboundary impact were recognized, the State would 
have  to  notify  the  potentially  affected  States  and  consult  with  them  possible 
measures to mitigate the risks.263
As concerns the substantial obligation, there are two points of view on how to look 
at it. The first one is operation-oriented. This is the point of view taken by the IGE. 
The  IGE  sees  the  substantive  preventive  obligation  as  an  obligation  to  prevent 
malicious cyber operations carried out by other States or non-state actors from the 
territorial  State’s  cyber  infrastructure.  It  alleges  that  the  substantial  preventive 
operation-oriented obligation lacks a knowledge requirement because it relates to 
hypothetical future cyber operations. Under this obligation, States would have to 
prevent malicious operations that they have no knowledge of; neither can have. I am 
of the same view as the International Group of Experts in this matter. Moreover, 
even the employment of all possible preventive measures cannot prevent malicious 
use of cyber infrastructure – neither monitoring of networks, nor surveillance of 
hacker groups’ activities. The substantial preventive operation-oriented obligation 
would put an onerous burden on States264 without a guarantee of the level of the 
262 Pulp Mills, supra note 53. para. 205.
263 Ibid., para. 204.
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Enviroment and 
Development. 1992. Principles 17 and 19.
264 SCHMITT. In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, supra note 45. p. 80.
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environmental protection efficiency. Therefore, it would not be reasonable to hold 
States  responsible  for  not  taking  material  steps  preventing  malicious  cyber 
operations.
The other view on the substantial preventive obligation is infrastructure-oriented. 
Instead of avoiding malicious cyber operations, the obligation would lie in avoiding 
activities  subject  to  authorization  and  control  of  territorial  State  that  affect  the 
security of its cyber infrastructure, making it possibly more vulnerable to uses in the 
malicious cyber operations against other States. The emphasis on authorization and 
control  of  the  territorial  State  better  reflects  the  application  practice  of  the 
international environmental law. Potentially harmful activities would be activities 
significantly  modifying  State’s  cyber  infrastructure,  making  it  possibly  more 
vulnerable to uses in cyber operations against other States, such as the construction 
of 5G networks.  It  is  an activity requiring State  authorization,  and its  realization 
bears potential risks of misuse.265
Nevertheless, it is not possible to imagine that States would be obliged to “avoid” the 
construction of 5G networks or similar activities only because there are risks of their 
misuse. In the normal course of events, the operation of cyber infrastructure, unlike 
the operation of smelters or pulp mills, does not cause any harm per se. Therefore,  
it would be unreasonable to require States to avoid inherently unharmful activities 
under  the  due  diligence  principle.  The  emphasis  should  be  rather  put  on  the 
exchange of best practices and information on cybersecurity and the establishment 
of communication channels for addressing serious cross-border incidents.
As regards the procedural obligation, the environmental impact assessment is based 
on the idea of high regulatory and control capacity of States related to the protection 
of  the  environment  mentioned  above.  The  assessment  is  conducted  before  a 
national  authority  authorizes  the  activity  in  concern.  In  the  cyber  context,  the 
265 See the introductory part of the Chapter 5 of the present thesis.
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assessed activities would be those that are subject to authorization and regulatory 
control  of  State.  Subsequently,  if  the cyber risk assessment  identified potentially 
significant harmful impact on other States’ infrastructures, the State of origin would 
notify the potentially affected States of this fact. In the environmental context, States 
of origin use to submit to the potentially affected States the whole environmental 
impact assessment as well as all related technical and other relevant information on 
which  the  assessment  was  based.266 The  environmental  impact  assessment  is  a 
transparent  process  open  for  public  participation.267 In  contrast,  disclosing  the 
outcome of a cyber risk assessment may endanger the assessed activity. Information 
sharing  is  much  more  sensitive  than  it  is  in  the  case  of  EIA  because  it  reveals 
vulnerabilities of essential systems and networks and it needs to be built on strong 
mutual  trust.268 The format of  the notification and consultation process  could be 
similar to the cross-border dependencies269 consultation format established within 
the European Union.
The  consultations  and  information  exchange  on  cross-border  dependencies  and 
risks related to them is incorporated in Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  6  July  2016  concerning  measures  for  a  high 
common level  of  security  of  network and information systems across  the Union 
(hereinafter NIS Directive) which sets forth that “where an entity provides an essential 
service in two or more Member States, those Member States should engage in bilateral or 
multilateral discussions with each other. This consultation process is intended to help them 
266 Pulp Mills, supra note 53. para. 33.
International Law Commission, Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part 2, 
New York and Geneva, 2001. Article 8.
267 Article 2 of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context.
268 The hesitant approach on information sharing revealed in the Guidelines for the EU Member 
States on information exchange on cross-border dependencies among the EU Members demonstrates 
how sensitive the information exchange may be even for close partners like the EU Member States.
269 In NIS Cooperation Group Guidelines for the Member States on voluntary information exchange on 
cross-border dependencies, a cross-border dependency is defined as “a critical reliance of an essential 
service of an EU Member State on a network or information system that is located in another Member State, 
without which the given essential service is unable to function.”
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assess the critical nature of the operator in terms of cross-border impact, thereby allowing 
each Member State involved to present its views regarding the risks associated with the 
services  provided.”270 As  a  result  of  the  consultation  process,  Member  States  gain 
information on their  dependencies and may apply adequate measures mitigating 
risks  related  to  the  dependencies  accordingly,  inter  alia,  update  their  list  of 
operators of essential services.
Although both the State potentially affected by the risk from the dependency and the 
State where from where the risk emanates may initiate the consultation process, the 
EU voluntary  guidelines  related  to  the process  presume that  the  Member  States 
potentially affected are those who are likely to iniciate the process and can have no 
expectiations towards States from where the risks emanate.271 Moreover, because of 
the  sensitivity  of  some  of  the  shared  information,  States  must  not  share  all 
information at their disposal. They may refuse to provide information the disclosure 
of  which  may  endanger  their  essential  interests  of  security,  to  safeguard  public 
policy  and  public  security,  and  to  allow  for  the  investigation,  detection,  and 
prosecution of criminal offenses.272 Under all circumstances, States should respect 
the  need-to-know  principle  in  order  to  avoid  unnecessary  information  sharing 
amongst those who are not engaged in the consultation process.273 The consultation 
should be conducted by the Member States’  Single Points of Contact,  bodies that 
shall  exercise  a  liaison  function  for  the  purposes  of  cooperation  under  the  NIS 
Directive.274 
Accordingly,  the  subject-matter  of  the  international  procedural  preventive 
obligation inspired by the EU consultation process would be limited to significant 
270 Recital 24 of the NIS Directive.
271 EU Guidelines on voluntary information exchange on cross-border dependencies, supra note 269. 
p. 5.
272 Recital 8 of the NIS Directive.
273 EU Guidelines on voluntary information exchange on cross-border dependencies, supra note 269. 
p. 6.
274 Ibid., p. 4.
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cross-border dependencies.  Beyond the scope of this  process,  the notifying State 
would not be obliged to take any further steps to ensure the prevention of harm to 
the  potentially  affected  State.  On  the  basis  of  the  provided  information,  the 
potentially affected State could apply appropriate risk mitigation measures, enhance 
the protection of its population against the disruptions of essential services275 and 
prepare itself for future incidents. The utility of such notification and consultation 
process is endorsed in the 2015 UN GGE report, which states that “States should seek 
to facilitate cross-border cooperation to address critical infrastructure vulnerabilities that 
transcend national borders.”276
Nevertheless,  as  noted in the NIS Directive, information sharing on cross-border 
dependencies  is  particularly  sensitive  and  even  within  the  EU,  where  the  trust 
between  Member  States  is  notable,  the  consultation  process  is  rather  descreet. 
Imposing  an  obligation  to  share  information  on  vulnerabilities  on  States  like 
Estonia,  Ukraine  or  Georgia  that  were  all  recently  targeted  by  large-scale  cyber 
operations  by  their  common  neighbor,  the  Russian  Federation,  would  be 
unreasonable and, in fact, unfair. Similarly, Israel, surrounded by Arabic States, has 
a history of mutual cyber attacks with its neighbors. Because of the high sensibility 
of  information  engaged  in  cyber  risk  assessment  and  unfortunate  but 
understandable  lack  of  trust  between  States  in  these  conditions,  a  procedural 
preventive  obligation  inspired  by  the  international  environmental  law  is  not 
adaptable to the cyber context, and it is not likely to be established soon. Therefore, 
notification and consultation of vulnerabilities with potential cross-border impact is 
likely to remain on the bilateral or regional level.
275 Ibid.
276 UN GGE 2015 Report, supra note 46. p. 9.
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6.2 Role of private entities related to the preventive feature of due 
diligence
The  prevention  of  malicious  cyber  operations  occurring  within  certain  cyber 
infrastructure largely depends on those who operate it as well as on the quality and 
security of the ICT components that are used in the infrastructure. Both operators of 
cyber infrastructure and producers of ICT components are private entities. Their 
role in the prevention of malicious cyber operations is, therefore, significant. Liu 
argues that they should consequently share of responsibility with States owed to the 
target States. This view is, however, exceptional. Nevertheless, the influential role of 
private entities must be reflected in relation to the due diligence principle.
Therefore, this section addresses the relations between States and private entities in 
relation to the compliance due diligence principle. I advocate that for guaranteeing 
high security of their infrastructure, States must, in particular, prudently consider 
which private entities they contract  for  building and operation of their  essential 
infrastructure  basing  their  preferences  on  security  needs,  and,  subsequently, 
impose  security  requirements  on  those  entities  and  control  their  compliance. 
Negligence  of  States  in  this  area  may  result  in  security  risks  not  only  for  the 
negligent State but also for any other State. In the last subsection, I comment on 
political  considerations  in  the  contracting  stage  States  face  in  the  case  of  the 
upcoming revolution of 5G networks.
6.2.1Duty to report cybersecurity incidents
Private  entities,  such  as  Internet  Service  Providers,  cloud  computing  service 
providers,  or  mobile  network  operators,  have  an  essential  role  in  securing 
cyberspace. Therefore, States use to adopt national regulations imposing obligations 
comprising  of  various  security  requirements  on  these  entities.277 The  most 
277 Along with the national security requirements, private entities also adopt standards and security 
guidelines produced by international organizations composed of representatives of industry. The 
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fundamental  duty  owed  by  these  private  entities  is  the  duty  to  report  severe 
cybersecurity incidents to the national authorities so that the authorities might help 
resolve  the  incidents.278 This  is  an  important  way  how  States  gain  an  actual 
knowledge  of  malicious  operations  in  their  cyber  infrastructures  that  may 
potentially target other States and trigger their due diligence obligation. Moreover, it 
is also an important way how to gain constructive knowledge with respect to the 
anticipated  future  operations.  Despite  these  important  implications  for  the 
effectivity of the due diligence principle, the IGE rejected that States should have any 
preventive  obligation  resting  on  the  adoption  of  national  legislation  requiring 
private entities to report incidents to the national authorities279 and maintained that 
States  should  rather  ensure  the  cooperation  with  these  private  entities  when 
problems actually occur.280
The national authorities receiving reports are usually national Computer Emergency 
Response  Teams (CERTs)281 comprising  of  ICT experts  that  subsequently  help  to 
resolve the reported incidents. If incidents posed a potential transboundary threat, 
the national CERTs should be able to communicate these threats to their respective 
partners abroad.  This  cooperation is  truly essential  for  timely response to cyber 
threats that are generally very invasive and fast-spreading. Establishing CERTs and 
most used cybersecurity standards for private companies on a global scale are ISO/IEC 27000-series 
standards elaborated by the International Organization for Standardization and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission. The family of ISO/IEC 27000 standards amounts to tens of standards. 
Most importantly, the ISO/IEC 27001 standard introduces an information security management 
system providing a systematic approach to managing ICT security of private companies.
278 To see an example of national legislation on the incident reporing and subsequent processes see 
MINÁRIK, Tomáš, rev. JANČÁRKOVÁ, Taťána. National Cyber Security Organisation: CZECHIA. 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2019.
279 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 7, para. 12.
280 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 1. Rule 7, paras. 19–20.
281 Glossary of Tallinn Manual 2.0 defines CERT as follows: “A team that provides initial emergency 
response aid and triage services to the victims or potential victims of ‘cyber operations’ (see below) or cyber 
crimes, usually in a manner that involves coordination between private sector and government entities. These 
teams also maintain situational awareness about malicious cyber activities and new developments in the 
design and use of ‘malware’ (see below), providing defenders of computer networks with advice on how to 
address security threats and vulnerabilities associated with those activities and malware.” Such teams are 
regularly also called CSIRTs (Computer Security Incident Response Teams) and Computer Security 
Incident Response Capabilities (CSIRC).
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the communication channels  between them is,  thus,  of  vital  importance for  the 
prevention  of  transnational  harm.  Therefore,  many  international  organizations 
recommended their member States to prioritize these tasks.282 Moreover, as a part of 
capacity-building  efforts,  States  are  encouraged  to  help  less  developed  States  to 
establish their own national CERTs.283
In addition,  some private entities  even establish their  own CERTs (or  CSIRTs).284 
Many of them participate in international associations founded for the purpose of 
information exchange on vulnerabilities, incidents, technical tools and other issues 
that affect the operation of CERTs. Moreover, these platforms join together private 
CERTs  and  national  CERTs  and  facilitate  their  cooperation.  For  instance,  FIRST 
(Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams), the largest association of CERTs, 
currently joins over 500 response teams – both nationals and privates – from all over 
the world.285
6.2.2“Polluter Pays” Principle
In relation to the essential role of private entities in securing cyber infrastructure, 
Liu suggested that the “polluter pays” principle should be applied in cyberspace.286 
Polluter pays principle is a principle of  international environmental law defined in 
the Rio Declaration as follows: “National authorities should endeavour to promote the 
282 Recommendations of the UN GGE 2013 Report and the UN GGE 2015 Report (both supra note 46) 
on confidence-building measures included, inter alia, the enhancement of information sharing 
between national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and among States on ICT security 
incidents in order to receive, collect, analyze and share information related to ICT incidents, for 
timely response, recovery and mitigation actions, or avoidance of misinterpretation of cyber 
operations as hostile State actions. Similar recommendation issued also the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development in its Recommendation on Digital Security of Critical 
Activities adopted in 2019 and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in its 2013 
Decision No. 1106 on the Initial Set of OSCE confidence-building measures to reduce the risks of 
conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies. 
283 The UN GGE 2013 Report (supra note 46) included an recommendation of “creating and 
strengthening incident response capabilities, including CERTs, and strengthening CERT-to-CERT 
cooperation.”
284 See note 268. 
285 The updated list of members of FIRST available from https://www.first.org/members/teams/. 
286 Liu, supra note 130. pp. 197, 206, 208–213.
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internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into 
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with 
due  regard  to  the  public  interest  and  without  distorting  international  trade  and 
investment.”287 Adopting this principle in cyberspace would partially shift the burden 
of preventive due diligence onto private entities.
Liu  advocates  that  under  this  principle,  both  the  individuals  conducting  cyber 
operations  as  well  as  the  infrastructure  operators  who  fail  to  secure  their 
infrastructure should be liable for “cyber-pollution” causing harm to a State.288 To 
make  this  principle  function,  State  would  have  to  adopt national  legislation 
criminalizing  large-scale  cyber  operations  in  order  to  punish  the  individuals 
conducting  hostile  cyber  operations  and  to  make  the  infrastructure  operators 
provide  reparations  for  insufficiently  securing  the  private  infrastructure  they 
operate.289
A framework for criminalization of malicious cyber activities and cooperation in 
investigations  is  introduced  in  the  Convention  on  Cybercrime  of  the  Council  of 
Europe, known as Budapest Convention.290 The Budapest Convention sets of a series 
of measures to be taken at the national level291 in the area of substantive criminal 
law (criminalization of defined criminal acts)292 as well as procedural criminal law 
(investigation and collection of electronic evidence).293 The implementation of the 
Budapest  Convention is indeed recommendable for  the purpose of prevention of 
malicious cyber activities.294 At the time of writing, there are 65 State Parties to the 
287 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Enviroment 
and Development. 1992. Principle 16.
288 Liu, supra note 130. p. 210.
289 Ibid.
290 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime. Council of Europe Treaty Series No.185. 23. 11. 2001.
291 See Chapter Two of the Convention on Cybercrime.
292 See Chapter Two Section One of the Convention on Cybercrime.
293 See Chapter Two Section Two of the Convention on Cybercrime.
294 BENDIEK, Annegret. Due Diligence in Cyberspace: Guidelines for International and European Cyber 
Policy and Cybersecurity Policy. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2016. ISSN 1863-1053. p. 6.
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Budapest  Convention,  including  non-members  of  Council  of  Europe.295 The 
Cybercrime Convention Committee established under the Convention ensures the 
effective use and implementation of the Convention.
Regarding  the  liability  of  operators  of  cyber  infrastructure,  Liu  suggests  that  if 
operations  were  liable  for  security  of  their  networks,  they  would  increase  their 
security  standards.  Thus  more  cyber  intrusions  would  be  prevented.  But  as  Liu 
acknowledges  himself,  “a  private  liability  regime  could  dilute  State  responsibility 
moving  questions  of  cyber-diligence  from  public  international  law  into  private 
international law. The principle risks ‘exonerating certain subjects of international law 
from their share of responsibility for damage’ caused by cyberattacks.” Moreover, it would 
not be reasonable to make the operators “pay” for each cyber operation that targets 
a State and violates its rights. As noted earlier, the requirement to prevent all cyber 
threats is deemed unreasonable.296
The  international  due  diligence  obligation  should  not  be  shifted  onto  private 
infrastructure  operators.  Instead,  States  should  set  up  domestic  security 
requirements  onto  the  private  entities  under  their  jurisdiction  and control  their 
compliance. Moreover, where necessary, they should prudently choose with which 
private entities they engage in cooperation and let  them build and operate their 
networks. This first step in securing cyber infrastructure against potential misuses is 
more important than it might look at first sight. The problem here is twofold. First, 
insufficient safety of ICT items and networks, including neglecting of their constant 
patching,  makes  them  vulnerable.  And  second,  ICT  devices  might  contain 
preinstalled backdoors, which can enable their producers to spy on them or even 
alter their functions or shut them down.
295 Although the Budapest Convention was negotiated by a regional international organization with 
restricted membership, under the Article 37 paragraph 1 of the Budapest Convention the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe, after consulting with and obtaining the unanimous consent of 
the Contracting States to the Convention, may invite any State which is not a member of the Council 
and which has not participated in its elaboration to accede to the Convention.
296 See subsection 5.2.1.
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6.2.3Political considerations in securing cyber infrastructures
Currently, an essential debate is taking place on a global scale on the involvement of 
Huawei, a Chinese corporation, in the building of 5G networks.297 Some States, like 
the United States,  Australia,  New Zealand,  or  Japan,  allege that  Huawei  poses  a 
security threat they are not willing to undertake. They are concerned that Huawei 
might  use  its  technologies  for  espionage  and  sabotage,298 referring  to  China's 
National Intelligence Law passed in 2017 that states that “any organization or citizen 
shall support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work in accordance with the 
law.”299 
Some other States  declared that  they would not  exclude Huawei  from supplying 
technologies to build their 5G infrastructures. However, they also do not have full 
trust in the Chinese corporation. The United Kingdom allowed Huawei to supply its 
technology, but only to a limited extent. The Chinese company should not provide 
any  “core”  technology  to  the  United  Kingdom.300 Similarly,  France  stated  that  it 
would  not  exclude  Huawei  from  the  competition,  but  it  remains  precautious  to 
protect its security interests.301
The Huawei case demonstrates that different States apply different standards and 
adopt different measures to mitigate cybersecurity risks. In this sense, differences of 
297 KHARPAL, Arjun. Here’s which leading countries have barred, and welcomed, Huawei’s 5G 
technology. CNBC [online], 25 April 2019. Available from https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/26/huawei-
5g-how-countries-view-the-chinese-tech-giant.html. 
298 As emphasized in the Prague Propossals adopted in May 2019 at the Prague 5G Security 
Conference, “due to the wide application of 5G based networks, unauthorized access to communications 
systems could expose unprecedented amounts of information or even disrupt entire societal processes.” The 
Prague Propossals are available from https://www.vlada.cz/en/media-centrum/aktualne/prague-5g-
security-conference-announced-series-of-recommendations-the-prague-proposals-173422/. 
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views of what is diligent and what is not may influence international relations. The 
United States sees Huawei as a security threat, so it urges its allies to exclude the 
corporation from the access to their 5G networks entirely. It warns them that taking 
a different approach than the United States  poses  may lead to the restriction of 
intelligence sharing because it  fears  that  the integrity  of  the shared confidential 
materials would be endangered by the negligent selection of a contractor.302
Whether or not, or under which conditions to allow a specific private company to 
participate in the building of a cyber infrastructure, is clearly a sovereign decision of 
each State. However, apart from the security concerns, economic and international 
political  considerations  are  heavily  involved  in  the  policymaking  on  Huawei 
potential threat as well. Not only the United States push on other States to adopt 
their view on Huawei. China recently warned Germany that the exclusion of Huawei 
from the German 5G network would not remain without consequences referring to 
potential consequences for robust economic co-operation of German carmakers and 
Chinese companies.303
302 Interview With Maria Bartiromo of Mornings With Maria on Fox Business Network. U.S. 
Department of State [online], 21 February 2019. Available from https://www.state.gov/interview-with-
maria-bartiromo-of-mornings-with-maria-on-fox-business-network-3/. 
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Cyberspace is a very complex and specific environment. It influences nearly every 
aspect of modern society, and the society has to adapt to it accordingly. One of the 
challenges brought by the growing importance of information and communication 
technologies  is  how  international  law  should  be  applied  in  cyberspace.  In  this 
context, an adequate application of the due diligence principle has the potential to 
adapt international law to the new phenomena of malicious cyber operations. With 
mitigation of the attribution problem and facilitation of denial of safe havens of non-
state actors, the due diligence principle offers valuable benefits of its application. 
This  fact  is  already being reflected within international  fora  and States’  position 
papers  on the application  of  international  law in  cyberspace.  The  due  diligence 
principle is shifting to the center of attention of the relevant debates. While more 
and more support the application of the due diligence principle in cyberspace,304 at 
the time of writing, there is no State that opposes its application.
Nevertheless,  to  fulfill  its  purpose  and  to  prove  beneficial,  the  due  diligence 
principle must be applied wisely. After analyzing the current state of the refinement 
of the due diligence application in the cyber context, I managed to identify three 
elements that trigger the due diligence obligation. These three elements are (1) use 
of the territorial State’s territory or, (2) knowledge the territorial State has of a cyber 
operation that is supposed to be stopped, and (3) violation of State’s rights. Each of 
the  three  elements  might  be  adjusted  by  a  corresponding  potential  adjustment 
(extraterritoriality, the concept of constructive knowledge, and additional threshold 
of serious adverse consequences) that could either extend or restrict the scope of the 
application of the due diligence obligation. The future use of these adjustments is 
304 States that expressively supported the application of the due diligence principle in cyberspace 
include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Estonia, Finland, France and the Netherlands. 
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dependent  on  the  further  refinement  of  the  due  diligence  principle  and  its 
application in State practice.
The  same  may  be  said  about  cyber-specific  aspects,  such  as  the  use  of  botnet 
networks and obligations of transit States,  that are likely to remain controversial 
until State practice determines how to treat them. For the future determination of 
the application of the due diligence principle is particularly important what should 
be considered as  reasonably expectable from States  in given circumstances.  The 
reasonable expectations are an underlying aspect of the due diligence principle and 
may  also  differ  according  to  the  availability  of  measures  States  are  capable  of 
employing to comply with the due diligence obligation. If they fail to comply with 
the  obligation,  the  injured  States  may  resort  to  acts  of  retorsions  and 
countermeasures. 
Examining the limits of the application of the due diligence principle in the last 
chapter,  I advocated  that  the  principle  of  prevention  that  forms part  of  the due 
diligence principle applied in international environmental law is not transferable to 
the cyber context. Furthermore, I assessed the role of certain private entities, such 
as Internet Service Providers or Mobile Network Operators, that have a significant 
impact on how the rights of other States are protected. I came to the conclusion that 
States should prudently consider which of these private entities they contract for 
building and operating their cyber infrastructures. Additionally, they should impose 
obligations on them, in particular, the obligation to report security incidents, so that 
they could satisfactorily comply with the due diligence obligation.
This  thesis  provided  a  complex  study  of  the  due  diligence  principle  and  its 
application in cyberspace. On the one hand, my research was limited by the absence 
of State practice explicitly reffering to the principle of due diligence. On the other 
hand, it was encouraged by the increasing attention the principle of due diligence 
gets in the current debates on the application of international law in cyberspace. 
83
During the research period alone, three States expressively endorsed the application 
of  the  principle  of  due  diligence.305 More  articulations  of  the  views  on  the  due 
diligence principle are expected to come. Hopefully, soon they will be accompanied 
by an adequate application of the due diligence principle in practice bringing more 
mutual respect and stability into the international relations.
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The Application of the Due Diligence Principle in Cyberspace
Abstract
The due diligence principle is a well-established general principle of international 
law. The adequacy of its use proved in many special regimes of international law, 
especially in international environmental law. Cyberspace is another regime where 
the application of the due diligence principle is desirable. An adequate application 
of the due diligence principle might mitigate the problem of attribution of cyber 
operations  and  help  in  denying  safe  havens  of  non-state  actors,  who  conduct 
malicious  operations in  cyberspace.  The  adequacy  of  the application  of  the  due 
diligence principle in cyberspace is further indicated by the results of discussions in 
international fora and by the emerging trend of support of the application in official 
declarations of  States  on the application of  international  law in cyberspace.  The 
thesis  further  suggests  how  the  due  diligence  principle  should  be  applied  by 
introducing  three  elements  that  trigger  the  due  diligence  obligation  and  three 
possible adjustments to them. It also identifies the essence of some controversial 
aspects  of  the  application  of  the  due  diligence  principle  and  introduces  cyber-
specific  considerations  for  the  determination  of  breaches  of  the  due  diligence 
obligation and evaluation of lawfulness of responses to the breach, which consist of 
acts  of  retorsion  and  countermeasures.  Lastly,  it  explains  why  the  principle  of 
prevention, which forms part of due diligence in international environmental law, is 
not  transferable  to  the cyber  context,  and what  is  the role  of  private  entities  in 
relation to the due diligence principle.
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Aplikace principu náležité péče v kybernetickém prostoru
Abstrakt
Princip náležité péče je ustálený obecný princip mezinárodního práva. Jeho použití 
se  osvědčilo  v mnoha  zvláštních  režimech  mezinárodního  práva,  zvláště 
v mezinárodním právu životního prostředí. Kybernetický prostor je dalším režimem, 
kde  se  aplikace  principu  náležité  péče  zdá  žádoucí.  Vhodná  aplikace  principu 
náležité  péče by mohla  zmírnit  problém přičitatelnosti  kybernetických operací  a 
také pomoci  v odstraňování  bezpečných přístavů  nestátních  aktérů  provádějících 
škodlivé  kybernetické  operace.  Vhodnost  použití  principu  náležité  péče  je  dále 
možno  dovozovat  z výsledků  diskuzí  na  půdě  mezinárodních  organizací  a 
nastupujícího  trendu  podpory  aplikace  principu  v oficiálních  prohlášeních  států 
ohledně aplikace mezinárodního práva v kybernetickém prostoru. Tato diplomové 
práce dále navrhuje, jak by měl být princip náležité péče aplikován. Uvádí tři prvky, 
které  dávají  vzniknout povinnosti  náležité péče a tři  možné přizpůsobující  prvky 
k nim.  Práce  také  představuje  podstatu  některých  sporných  aspektů  aplikace 
principu  náležité  péče  a  upozorňuje  na  okolnosti  specifické  pro  kybernetický 
prostor, které je třeba brát v potaz při určování porušování povinnosti náležité péče 
a  vyhodnocování  oprávněnosti  reakcí  na  takové  porušení.  Práce  také  vysvětluje, 
proč  princip  prevence,  který  je  součástí  náležité  péče  v mezinárodním  právu 
životního prostředí, není převoditelný do kybernetického kontextu, a jakou roli při 
plnění povinnosti náležité péče zaujímají soukromé entity.
Klíčová slova
náležitá péče – kybernetický prostor – protiopatření 
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